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Abstract: An important context for contemporary trade frictions is the emergence, since the 
1990s, of a wide range of new forms of market capitalism, of which China’s hybrid market 
economy is the most significant. Institutional diversity of this kind is a source of strength and 
dynamism for the global trading system, but it is also the cause of very serious friction. The 
GATT/WTO system has dealt with this problem before, but the existing settlement regarding 
the legitimate boundaries of institutional diversity is under pressure, and needs to be 
revisited. One concept which has been incorporated into WTO trade defences law (and 
elsewhere) to help draw these boundaries is the concept of the ‘market distortion’. The 
concept can be a useful one, but it has so far been interpreted and applied with an 
inadequate appreciation of its serious conceptual and practical difficulties. The potential 
result is a system of trade defences targeted in a discriminatory and even punitive manner 
against heterodox institutional forms, in ways which may excessively dis-incentivise 
institutional experimentation. In response, this paper argues for an approach to the 
interpretation and application of this concept which proceeds from an understanding of the 
institutionally embedded character of markets. This does not take the form of a readily 
available ‘solution’, but rather a messy and evolving set of legal techniques which, in the best 
case, can form the legal basis of a practical and justifiable approach to the tensions caused 
by institutional diversity. A toolkit of legal techniques of this kind clearly cannot take the 
place of a more foundational political settlement of some sort, but it is a necessary 
accompaniment to it, if we are to preserve the aspiration towards a genuinely non-
discriminatory and rules-based global economic order. 
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There is no single root cause of the present instability of the international economic order. 
For some, the core problem is the radically unequal distribution of the gains and losses 
associated with the contemporary period of globalisation. Existing economic institutions and 
structures have been challenged as those who have lost or gained little from globalisation 
withdraw their support from a system which appears not to work to their advantage. For 
others, the primary explanation is the relative erosion of US global economic hegemony, 
which has both left the US less willing to act as the guarantor of the system in its present 
form, and also given rise to increasingly urgent efforts to reshape the system in ways which 
may more reliably sustain existing distributions of economic power. And for others still, the 
present system is under attack because it has failed to deliver on its promise of economic self-
determination at the national level, as political communities feel their futures constrained and 
directed by global rules, institutions and logics which are beyond any sense of their 
immediate control.  
 
This paper starts with the claim that the current period of instability is also the result, in part, 
of far-reaching changes to the institutional underpinnings of the global economy which have 
occurred over the last quarter century or so since the end of the Cold War, as a range of 
former socialist and centrally planned economies have transformed into a range of new and 
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heterodox market forms. Like many others, I see the present instability as driven at a 
fundamental level by frictions in the US-China relationship. I also take my cue from those 
who see these frictions as in turn being driven by the unexpected emergence in China of an 
unfamiliar form of market capitalism, which has both radically upended existing patterns of 
global comparative advantage, and confounded many of those who expected (reasonably or 
not) that China’s economic system would converge towards Western models of market 
capitalism after its accession to the WTO in 2001.  
 
The argument I seek to make in this paper is in five moves. First, in section 1, I seek to 
reframe the problem of ‘Chinese state capitalism’ by locating it as just one illustration of a 
larger and more general issue, namely, the emergence of a wide range of new forms of 
market capitalism over the last quarter century, coupled with a much greater degree of 
integration between them in conditions of economic globalisation. This institutional diversity 
is a strength of the global economic order, but it also leads to competitive tensions. In section 
2, I examine the ways in which the GATT/WTO regime has dealt with similar challenges in 
the past, and argue that while convergence around liberal market principles has been an 
important objective of the GATT/WTO membership, so too has the preservation of 
institutional diversity and the capacity for institutional innovation. I then observe, in section 
3, that the notion of the ‘market distortion’ has emerged, in both public and policy discourse, 
as well as jurisprudentially, as one of the key concepts used to delineate legitimate from 
illegitimate institutional experimentation. This is not unique to trade law – in fact it is a far 
more general trend occurring across a range of regimes of international economic 
governance. I argue in Secion 4 that this notion is far more difficult to operationalise than is 
typically understood. A coherent and defensible application of the concept needs to start with 
an appreciation of the institutionally embedded character of markets. Accordingly, a 
distinction logically needs to be drawn between governmental actions which constitute 
‘market distortions’ and those which help to establish the institutional conditions in which 
markets operate. In section 5, I show that the application of the concept of ‘market distortion’ 
in WTO law so far has not adequately appreciated this, and as a result, the jurisprudence is at 
risk of developing in problematic directions. Finally, in section 6, I assess the promises and 
pitfalls of a range of specifically legal techniques1 for addressing these risks, and developing 
a more institutionally-sensitive way of applying the concept of ‘market distortion’ in a legal 
context. None of these techniques provide clean solutions to the conceptual problems 
identified – this is in principle probably impossible – but, when coupled with a serious and 
sophisticated appreciation of relations between markets and the institutions which constitute 
them, they may provide a pragmatic toolbox of sorts for adjudicators seeking to avoid some 
of the worst of the dangers identified. 
 
 
1. Reframing the problem: institutional diversity and global trade 
 
When China joined the World Trade Organisation in 2001, the expectation of its most 
important trading partners was evidently that its economic system would continue to evolve 
in the direction of marketization, along the path it had started as early as the 1970s. Indeed, 
China has in fact liberalized its markets in significant ways since joining the WTO, and its 
                                               
* Professor of Law, Chair in International Law and Global Governance, University of Edinburgh Law School.  
1 As I explain further below, my focus on legal techniques does not imply that the contemporary trade instability 
is resolvable through the application of legal techniques, but rather that finding an adequate set of such 
techniques is a necessary element if a durable solution is to be found which preserves the aspiration towards a 
rules-based trading order.  
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program of economic reform continues.2 However, the process of marketization and 
liberalization has taken place experimentally and incrementally, and always in a manner 
which is perceived to be consistent with its larger strategic goals of economic development, 
rapid technological advancement, and political stability. As a result, the emergent form of 
market capitalism in China appears to Western eyes as an unfamiliar hybrid of intense market 
competition in some sectors, managed competition in others, and high degrees of state 
direction on others – most often termed “state capitalism”.3  
 
As a consequence, a perception has emerged within influential trade policy circles that China 
has reneged on the promise it was understood to have made upon its accession to the WTO, 
that it would gradually converge towards a Western model of state-market relations. In a 
statement to the WTO General Council on 26 July 2018, for example, entitled ‘China’s 
Disruptive Economic Model’, US Ambassador Dennis Shea made the claim that 
 
[c]ontrary to Members’ expectations, China has not been moving toward a fuller 
embrace of market-based policies and practices since it joined the WTO in 2001.  In 
fact, the opposite is true.  The state’s role in China’ economy has been increasing.4 
 
The Chinese Ambassador’s response made clear China’s view that there is ‘more than one 
model of market economy’, and that it is perfectly legitimate for China to pursue the model 
which suits its ‘own national situation and circumstances’.5  
 
As this exchange of views helps to make clear, however, contemporary trade tensions 
between the United States and China can be seen as symptomatic of a much broader problem. 
They are not – or not just – the result of China’s path of economic reform deviating from the 
expectations of its most important trading partners. They are, in a deeper sense, also the result 
of precisely the global spread of market capitalism since the last decades of the twentieth 
century, and the consequent emergence of variegated forms of market capitalism in and 
across different parts of the globe. In the years following the collapse of communism, as 
states throughout the former ‘second’ and ‘third’ worlds embarked upon transitions to 
market-based economic systems, it appeared to many that the world was heading in the 
                                               
2 The literature is voluminous. For one comprehensive recent overview of China’s response to WTO litigation 
see Zhou, China’s Implementation of the Rulings of the World Trade Organization (Oxford: Hart, 2019). One 
very useful set of perspectives on China’s transformation, now a decade old but still important, can be found in 
Brandt and Rawski (eds.), China's Great Transformation (Cambridge: CUP, 2008). 
3 Within legal scholarship see, eg, Wu, ‘The ‘China, Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance’, 57(2) 
Harvard International Law Journal 261–324 (2016); Du, ‘China’s State Capitalism and World Trade Law’, 
63(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 409–448 (2014). See also, Ferguson, ‘We Are All State 
Capitalist Now’, Foreign Policy (February 2012); Wooldridge, ‘The rise of state capitalism: something quite 
new’, The Economist (19 January 2012). McNally’s informed account uses the term ‘Sino-capitalism’: 
McNally, ‘Sino-capitalism: China’s Reemergence and the International Political Economy’, 64(4) World 
Politics 741-776 (2012). 
4 Statement by Ambassador Dennis Shea, ‘Views on China’s trade-disruptive economic model and implications 
for the WTO’, WTO General Council, Geneva, 26 July 2018, available at 
https://geneva.usmission.gov/2018/07/27/55299/, last accessed 30 September 2019. See also the statements to 
be found in China’s most recent Trade Policy Review, Trade Policy Review: China, Minutes of the Meeting, 
WTO Doc WT/TPR/M/375, 21 November 2018, and Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade 
Ministers of the United States, Japan, and the European Union, New York, 25 September 2018, available at 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/september/joint-statement-trilateral, last 
accessed 30 September 2019.  
5 Statement by H.E. Ambassador Dr. Zhang Xiangchen at the WTO General Council Meeting, Geneva, 26 July 
2018, available at http://wto2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/chinaviewpoins/201807/20180702770676.shtml, last 
accessed 30 September 2019. 
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direction of institutional convergence, to one degree or another. This was, it turns out, a 
mistake: markets are highly variegated and socially embedded institutional orders, and 
marketization is best understood as an open-ended process of competition-oriented 
institutional change rather than a defined institutional endpoint.6 As we now know, national 
projects of marketization initiated during this period have each evolved according to different 
dynamics, with the result that over time a variety of new and heterodox market forms have 
emerged in different countries and regions of the world. ‘Every transition to capitalism’, it 
has been observed, has ‘produced a new variety of capitalism’.7  
 
Institutional diversity, it should be noted, is a systemic strength of the international economic 
order. It is, as the literature on comparative capitalisms has taught us, one of the key 
determinants of comparative advantage, and a foundation for international specialization.8 
One of the lessons of the history and development of the postwar trading system is that global 
institutional innovation contributes to the long-term strength, resilience and dynamism of the 
global economy. Some of the major periods of structural transformation in the global 
economy, including periods of major gains in productive efficiency and the integration of 
marginalised populations, have been associated with periods of profound institutional 
experimentation. The presence of multiple different market forms is efficiency-enhancing at 
the systemic level, even if it also creates inefficiencies in the form of specific transaction 
costs on individual firms conducting business across borders. This is an important point: any 
attempt to address the issue of institutional diversity must pay careful attention to this 
fundamental trade-off. 
 
At the same time, however, institutional difference is also certainly a genuine source of 
friction within the global trading order – that is to say, of deeply felt perceptions of unfair 
competition. Institutional arrangements in one state may, for one reasons or another, be 
perceived to give firms based in that state unfair competitive advantages in global markets. In 
relation to China, such claims are very familiar. Chinese firms are claimed to be unfairly 
advantaged by virtue of a range of measures associated with the nature of the Chinese 
government’s involvement in its economy: the soft budget constraints associated with 
government ownership or control, the receipt of inputs at below market rates by state-
controlled enterprise, direct subsidies from the Chinese government, as well as more 
indirectly by its export and taxation regimes. ‘Level playing field’ concerns of this kind may 
or may not have a good economic rationale in particular cases, but they play a huge role in 
the political economy of trade policy, as perceptions of the fairness of global competition is 
crucial to maintaining support for liberal trade over the longer term.9  
 
                                               
6 See the literature cited below nn17-18. 
7 Fligstein and Zhang, ‘A new agenda for research on the trajectory of Chinese capitalism’, 7 Management and 
Organization Review 39–62 (2011), at 47. 
8 See, eg, Hall and Soskice, D. (eds), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative 
Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
9 Bown rightly makes the point that, in principle, it is not sufficient to object to a trading partner’s institutional 
choices without a clear account of the specific cross-border costs that they impose, and has provided a helpful 
way of thinking about the different costs which might arise: Bown, ‘The 2018 US-China Trade Conflict After 
40 Years of Special Protection’, 12(2) China Economic Journal 109 (2019), especially 126. For the purposes of 
my argument, it seems to me that Bown’s first category (adjustment costs) is relevant, as is the notion that 
institutional choices in one country may impact on the substainability of institutional arrangements in another, 
but probably most importantly that core notions of fairness of competitive conditions have a residual importance 
in trade policy over and above concerns about the precise nature of cross-border economic externalities. 
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In the decades since the 1990s, as more heterodox market forms have become more deeply 
integrated into the global economy, these frictions have intensified. The result has been to 
reopen one of the fundamental issues of global economic order, which concerns the 
legitimate or ‘fair’ range of institutional diversity fairly permitted in conditions of global 
competition. At what point do new or heterodox market forms cease to constitute legitimate 
experimentation, or the legitimate expression of local values and choices, and become a form 
of ‘cheating’ on the terms of fair competition in international trade? Finding an adequate 
response to this question is one of the core challenges for the contemporary trading system – 
and, crucially, finding an adequate way of expressing that response in a legal framework is 
one of the core challenges for those who wish to maintain a multilateral ‘rules-based’ trading 
order.  
 
There is an important distinction to be made here. What is at stake is not, or not primarily, the 
degree of institutional diversity permitted by international trade rules. The continued 
diversity of market forms is a fundamental feature of the contemporary global economic 
order, and it is not realistic to imagine international trade rules limiting the extent of that 
diversity in any simple way.10 What is more importantly at stake is the existence of the 
capacity and opportunity to innovate institutionally, its direction, and its distribution between 
different states within the global economic system. How far will certain institutional choices 
on the part of one state enable other states to respond by reducing their access to foreign 
markets? What rules, in other words, will govern the conditions of competition between 
differently instituted market orders – including the ways in which certain institutional choices 
are matched up with positions of advantage and disadvantage in global market competition? 
It is important to recall that it is not only conditions of competition between firms in a given 
market order which must be fair, but also the distribution of the capacity to innovate 
institutionally between states. This is the second core trade-off which must be kept in mind 
when addressing the challenge of institutional diversity.  
 
 
2. The management of institutional diversity in GATT/WTO history 
 
In thinking about this challenge, a clear contrast which has emerged between two camps.11 
There are on one side those who believe that a condition of full participation in the 
multilateral trading system ought to be adherence to a set of basic liberal market principles, 
of one or another form. On this view, the GATT/WTO system has worked well in the past 
precisely because it has for the most part operated as a club of like-minded market-oriented 
economies. Tensions caused by institutional diversity have, for the most part, been solved by 
gradual institutional convergence around Western market models. On the other side are those 
who think that the GATT/WTO system ought to be able to accommodate a broad diversity of 
market arrangements, and even economic systems. For those who take this view, the history 
of the GATT/WTO regime discloses a careful balancing between the twin values of 
institutional diversity and the promotion of liberal market principles, and this careful 
balancing has been an important source of its strength and durability.  
 
                                               
10 See, eg, Hall and Soskice, above n8.  
11 Mavroidis and Sapir also helpfully characterize the debate in this way in their excellent recent paper, 
Mavroidis and Sapir, ‘China and the World Trade Organisation: Towards a Better Fit’, Bruegel Working Paper, 
Issue 06, 11 June 2019, available at https://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/WP-2019-06-110619_.pdf, 
, last accessed 30 September 2019, at 6.   
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It is common ground between the two camps that, in many respects, the original GATT 1947 
was remarkably flexible in its toleration of a wide variety of different economic systems. 
Institutional diversity has always been at least a factual reality amongst the GATT 
membership, and the GATT from its beginnings has always displayed a pragmatic openness 
to economic systems of various kinds. This is most vividly illustrated, for example, by the 
treatment given to the former socialist bloc countries during its first decades.12 While the 
original GATT contracting parties ended up being almost exclusively market economies of 
one form or another, it is also true that an invitation had been extended to the USSR to 
become part the initial GATT negotiations very early on. This invitation was ultimately 
declined – and indeed the socialist bloc as a whole initially avoided the GATT and viewed it 
with some suspicion as an instrument of capitalist expansion – but it represented an important 
signal that the key founders of the system saw it as potentially compatible with domestic 
economic systems of many kinds. Some years later, when a number of Eastern European 
countries changed course and expressed an interest in participating in the GATT, a way was 
ultimately found for them to do so, albeit gradually. In addition, aside from these centrally 
planned economies, the GATT showed itself able to accommodate within its membership a 
range of mixed economies, in which the state played a very central role. This included a 
variety of Central and South American countries, as well as India, and – perhaps most 
importantly for present purposes – Japan, which acceded to the GATT in 1955.  
 
This factual reality was reflected in the formal content of the rules themselves. There is 
nothing in the GATT 1947 which requires adherence to a particular economic system as a 
condition of membership. On the contrary, the drafters of the GATT 1947 designed a system 
of rules which clearly reflected, and accommodated, the diverse institutional choices made by 
its original contracting parties. It was always understood that there was a real limit to how far 
the international trade regime could, and indeed should, seek to discipline deviance from a 
particular idea of state-market relationships. As a consequence, as is well-known, few if any 
legal requirements were included to reduce state ownership of commercial enterprises, state 
trading enterprises and other state monopolies were permitted and subject to only the 
relatively relaxed disciplines of GATT Article XVII, large-scale governmental stabilisation 
programs in the agricultural sector were explicitly permitted, and the original GATT 
agreement contained no serious disciplines on either domestic or export subsidies.  
 
Disagreements emerge, however, when it comes to attaching significance to this factual and 
formal openness.13 A number of recent contributions to the literature have taken the view that 
the GATT’s flexibility and pluralism regarding its members’ domestic economic systems is 
best seen as exceptional, or as a concession to political realities, and thus not reflective of the 
underlying ‘liberal understanding of law and economy’ shared by the GATT membership as a 
                                               
12 For accounts of the GATT’s relations with socialist economies, see, for example, Kostecki, East-West Tade 
and the GATT System (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1979); Reuland, ‘GATT and State-Trading 
Countries’, 9 Journal of World Trade Law 318 (1975); Grzybowski, ‘Socialist Countries in GATT’, 28 
American Journal of Comparative Law 539-554 (1980); Grzybowki, ‘East-West Trade Regulations in the 
United States, The 1974 Trade Act, Title IV’, 11 Journal of World Trade Law 506 (1977); Irwin, Mavroidis and 
Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 2008). More 
recently, see Mavroidis and Sapir, above n11. 
13 Key contributions to this debate include Wu, above n3, and more recently Mavroidis and Sapir, above n11. 
See also Lang, ‘Heterodox market orders in the global trade system’ in Santos, Thomas and Trubek (eds), 




whole. 14 The USSR, it is noted, never did join the GATT negotiations. Yugoslavia, Romania, 
Poland and Hungary did not trade with GATT contracting in large enough volumes to cause 
serious concern, and their presence in the GATT was so unusual that special rules had to be 
incorporated into their accession protocols to make it workable. Japan’s accession was in 
significant part political – a function of strong backing by its geopolitical ally, the United 
States – and indeed subject to non-application under GATT Article XXXV for many years by 
a large number of GATT contracting parties. In any case, the unusual position of Japan, it is 
noted in such accounts, was resolved in due course by its transition to a more recognisably 
Western model of economic organisation. The same has also been said of other large and 
important mixed economies, such as India and Brazil.  
 
But the most telling examples, for such accounts, come after the creation of the WTO, when a 
wide variety of former socialist economies negotiated their accession. In such cases, the 
process of WTO accession has routinely been used as a mechanism to encourage, or at least 
recognise and lock in, greater adherence to free market principles. Accession negotiations 
have paid particular attention, for example, to the progress of ongoing privatization programs, 
the administration of government pricing policies (for example in the energy sector), and the 
extent of administrative discretion in the regulation of economic life, and certain obligations 
on these and other matters frequently found their way into these states’ accession protocols.15 
The process of WTO accession for China was similar to the extent that the carrot of WTO 
membership was evidently deployed by major trading powers in the WTO as an instrument to 
encourage liberal economic reform in China. Indeed, China’s Accession Protocol contains a 
series of China-specific obligations requiring China to establish a domestic market-based 
order – including obligations regarding a general right to import and export goods, the 
conduct of state-owned enterprises, the elimination of technology transfer obligations and 
other performance requirements, as well as a broad obligations to ‘allow prices for traded 
goods and services in every sector to be determined by market forces’.16  
 
This historical account has a great deal to commend it, but at the same time is open to a 
number of important criticisms. Two are particularly relevant here. One is that it almost 
certainly overestimates the degree of institutional convergence amongst the majority of 
GATT contracting parties with market-oriented economies. The fundamental character of 
global capitalisms as a highly variegated social and economic forms is well established.17 
                                               
14 Mavroidis and Sapir, above n11, at 5 and generally. Though note that Mavroidis, writing with Janow, also 
rightly recalls the GATT’s openness to different systems as one of its ‘central strength[s]’: see Mavroidis and 
Janow, ‘Free Markets, State Involvement, and the WTO: Chinese State-Owned Enterprises in the Ring’, 16:4 
World Trade Review 571-581 (2017), at 572. 
15 See, eg, UNCTAD, ‘“The Non-Market Economy” Issue In International Trade In The Context Of WTO 
Accessions’, UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/MISC.20, 9 October 2002, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/ditctncdmisc20_en.pdf, last accessed 30 September 2019; Michalopoulos, ‘World 
Trade Organization Accession for Transition Economies: Problems and Prospects’ 36 (2) Russian & East 
European Finance and Trade 63-86 (2000); Geraets, Accession to the World Trade Organization: A Legal 
Analysis (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2018), and more recently Mavroidis and Sapir, above n11, at section 
3.1. More generally, for an insightful account of club dynamics in the history of the GATT, see Nicolas Lamp, 
‘The Club Approach to Multilateral Trade Lawmaking’ 49 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 107-190 
(2016).  
16 WTO, Accession of the People’s Republic of China – Decision of 10 November 2001, WT/L/432 (23 
November 2001) (‘China Accession Protocol’), eg, sections 5, 6, 7(3), 9. See generally Qin, ‘“WTO-Plus” 
Obligations and Their Implications for the WTO Legal System’, 37(3) Journal of World Trade 483-522 (2003). 
17 I refer here generally to the voluminous literature which has grown since the late 1990s on comparative 
capitalisms. See generally, eg, Peck and Theodore, ‘Variegated capitalism’, 31 Progress in Human Geography 
731–772 (2007); Wood and Lane (eds), Capitalist Diversity and Diversity within Capitalism (London: 
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Indeed, the diverse institutional features of many of the most well-known historical market 
forms – American liberal market capitalism, the German social market economy, French 
dirigisme, Scandinavian social democracy, the British postwar mixed economy, and so on – 
were already established in the years either side of World War 2, and clearly present in the 
GATT membership from the beginning. Furthermore, the perception that economies such as 
Japan, India and Brazil have largely converged towards a Western model is not borne out by 
those who have engaged in close study of those economies.18 Even such convergence as has 
occurred has by and large been the result of broader historical and political developments, 
rather than the direct result of GATT/WTO membership. Intra-capitalist institutional 
diversity has always been a central feature of the global trading system, and of the GATT 
regime itself.19  
 
The second, which follows directly from the first, is that it appears to underestimate the 
importance and centrality to the GATT/WTO system of mechanisms to manage and minimise 
the frictions caused by trade between different economic systems.20 One of the most 
important of these mechanisms was the right to take defensive measures in the form of 
increased duties against ‘dumped’ or subsidised products. It was Jackson who first 
perceptively noted that these trade defence mechanisms could act in practice as ‘an 
“interface” or buffer mechanism to ameliorate difficulties … caused by interdependence 
among different economic systems.’21 As he explained, in the context of institutional 
diversity, establishing a consensus view of what constitutes ‘fair’ trade – in the sense of 
establishing a single baseline of universal market institutions – was not only impossible, but 
also in tension with the pluralist institutional ethos of the GATT just described. The approach 
taken, then, was to give each state relatively broad freedom to take unilateral defensive action 
on the basis of its own vision of what constituted fair and unfair trade. Such defensive 
measures, as long as they were kept within certain bounds, could act ‘as a crude or blunt 
instrument to cause different economic systems to more equitably share the burdens of 
                                               
Routledge, 2012); Hall and Soskice, above n8; Lane and Myant (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism in Post-
Communist Countries (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Jackson and Deeg, ‘Comparing capitalisms: 
understanding institutional diversity and its implications for international business’ (2008) 39 Journal of 
International Business Studies 540-61; Amable, The Diversity of Modern Capitalism, (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2003). 
18 In respect of Japan (and other East Asian capitalisms) see for example: Witt and Redding, The Oxford 
Handbook of Asian Business Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Witt and Redding, ‘Asian 
business systems: institutional comparison, clusters and implications for varieties of capitalism and business 
systems theory’, 11(2) Socio-Economic Review 265-300 (2013); Boyer, Uemura and Isogai (eds.) Diversity and 
Transformations of Asian Capitalisms (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012); Tipton, ‘Southeast Asian Capitalism: 
History, Institutions, States, and Firms’, 26 Asia Pacific Journal of Management 401-434 (2009); Amable, 
above n17; Berger and Dore (eds.) National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1996); Storz, Amable, Casper and Lechavalier, ‘Bringing Asia into the comparative capitalism 
perspective’, 11(2) Socio-Economic Review 217-232 (2013); Whitley, Business Systems in East Asia: Firms, 
Markets and Societies (London: Sage, 1992); Hundt and Uttam, Varieties of Capitalism in Asia: Beyond the 
Developmental State (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); Walter and Zhang (eds.), East Asian 
Capitalism: Diversity, Continuity and Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
19 This story told more fully in Lang, above n13.  
20 John Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 1st ed., 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), at 218. 
21 Jackson, above n20, at 218; also Jackson, Davey and Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic 
Relations, 3rd ed. (Eagan, Minn: West Publishing, 1995), at 668-72, 1140-42. For discussion of this view, see 
Kennedy, ‘The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy: John Jackson and the Field of International 




adjusting to shifts of world trade flow’.22 These mechanisms were only relatively rarely used 
during the first decades of the GATT, but were one of the main instruments used to address 
the frictions caused by the emergence of East Asian capitalist forms – and in particular the 
emergence of Japan as a global trading power – over the course of the 1970s and 1980s.23 
And, as is well known, the application of a special set of rules on trade defences, applicable 
only to China, was a central pillar of the arrangements under which its accession to the WTO 
was agreed.24  
 
There were many other mechanisms which allowed countries to respond by lawfully limiting 
trade with selected countries, where institutional differences were perceived to amount to 
‘unfairness’ of one form or another. Others, not typically triggered by allegations of ‘unfair’ 
trade practices but sometimes performing a similar function, included: safeguards under 
GATT Article XIX; the careful crafting tariff concessions to favour products which did not 
give rise to such frictions; as well as all of the ad hoc and idiosyncratic mechanisms familiar 
to historians of the GATT, from voluntary export restraints, to non-application procedures 
under GATT Article XXXV, to country-specific rules in accession protocols, and so on. Such 
mechanisms are not marginal and exceptional, but built into the architecture of the regime, 
and central to its smooth functioning, as well as its durability over time.  
 
The better view, then, is to see the GATT/WTO’s approach to the problem of institutional 
diversity as a messy and evolving – but, as it turns out, mostly quite workable – mix of 
techniques for encouraging convergence around basic liberal market principles, and 
mechanisms for ensuring managing the tensions caused by institutional diversity. Institutional 
convergence historically had a role to play in addressing trade frictions, but it was hardly the 
regime’s only effective response, and perhaps not even the primary one. Indeed, it is probably 
fair to say that the push towards institutional convergence around liberal market principles 
provided by the GATT/WTO system has been somewhat weaker than is often stated – and, 
furthermore, that the precise content and boundaries of such principles have been more 
ambiguous and ill-defined than is usually acknowledged. Instead, a key lesson is that 
mechanisms to manage frictions caused by the co-existence of different systems – especially 
trade defences – have been much more important than is sometimes recognized in 
maintaining the stability of the system. That said, it is also true that existing trade defence 
regimes have proved themselves at times to be a particularly blunt method of fulfilling that 
function, and are constantly in danger of going beyond it. Even in the 1980s, the US use of 
such measures against imports from heterodox economies was subject to criticism for being 
inefficient, politically captured, and ideologically driven.25  
 
Why is this history important now, and why is it central to my argument? In section 6, I shall 
argue that a workable legal solution to the problem of institutional diversity is likely to take 
the form of a set of general principles, which must be interpreted and applied in a way which 
is deeply sensitive to the intentions and values of its drafters, to the strengths and weaknesses 
                                               
22 Jackson, above n20, at 244. 
23 See, eg, Bown and McCulloch, ‘U.S.-Japan and U.S.-China Trade Conflict: Export Growth, Reciprocity, and 
the International Trading System’, 20(6) Journal of Asian Economics 669-687 (November 2009), available 
at https://www.chadpbown.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Bown-McCulloch-JAE-2009.pdf, , last accessed 
30 September 2019; Bayard and Elliott, Reciprocity and Retaliation in U.S. Trade Policy (Washington, DC: 
Institute for International Economics, 1994); Zeng, Trade Threats, Trade Wars: Bargaining, Retaliation, and 
American Coercive Diplomacy (University of Michigan Press, 2004).  
24 China Accession Protocol, above n16, section 15, esp paras (a) and (b).  
25 Tarullo, ‘Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade’ (1987) 100(3) Harvard Law Review 
546-628. See also generally the literature referred to in n49 below.  
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of the WTO as an institution, and to the limitations of what can legitimately be achieved 
through international adjudication. In that context, this history is crucial. It reminds us that 
the promotion of liberal market values has been an important objective of the GATT/WTO 
Membership – but that so too has the preservation of institutional diversity and the capacity 
for institutional innovation, against which it has always been balanced. It further suggests that 
expecting to achieve significant domestic institutional change through the application of 
WTO law is probably unrealistic, and is certainly inconsistent with our historical experience 
of how the regime works, when it is working well. And it makes clear that having a 
functional ‘buffer’ mechanism, as Jackson called it, is likely to be crucial in resolving the 
current tensions.26 I shall return to each of these propositions in due course. 
 
 
3. ‘Market distortions’ and ‘distorted markets’ 
 
I said above the current US-China trade war, and the emergence of ‘Sino-capitalism’, raises 
the fundamental question of how to tell the difference between ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ institutional 
conditions of market capitalism, and how to approach irresolvable differences of view as to 
what ‘fairness’ entails? My aim in the following sections is not to provide a definitive answer 
to this question – this is almost certainly a fool’s errand, and in any case probably 
unnecessary as a practical matter – but rather to assess the adequacy of one of the main legal 
tools which has emerged in response to it. This legal tool is the concept of the ‘market 
distortion’, or, equivalently, the notion of the ‘distorted market’. The core idea here is the 
relatively simple one that the legitimate boundaries of institutional variety can be established 
by reference to the notion of a distorted market: where the institutional choice in question 
‘distorts’ conditions of competition in the relevant market, it is more likely to be considered 
‘unfair’, and to trigger legitimate responsive action. The attraction of such an approach is 
clear: market distortions are presumptively both inefficient and inconsistent with accepted 
norms of free and fair competition, so their presence appears to offer a relatively objective, 
and widely accepted, indication of an illegitimate intervention. The argument I seek to make 
in the remainder of this paper, however, is that, if the concept of a ‘market distortion’ is to be 
used as a normative yardstick in this way, it must be accompanied by a sophisticated 
understanding of the institutionally embedded character of markets – without this, it risks 
incoherence, and indeed chauvinism. I suggest that such an understanding has so far mostly 
been absent, I show the problems then has led to in the WTO context, and then offer some 
thoughts about how this might be corrected. 
                                               
26 Arguably, it is the decreasing functionality of the latter – especially trade defences – which has helped to 
precipitate the present crisis. On one side, there is the sense that WTO law on subsidies and antidumping no 
longer permits states to take adequate responsive action to what they perceive as the unfairness of emergent 
forms of East Asian capitalism. I am referring here not only to the operation of section 15(a)(ii) of China’s 
Accession Protocol (though the effect of this is unclear given the suspension of proceedings in European Union 
— Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies, DS516, which effectively permits the continued use 
of an NME methodology against China at least for the present), but also to the well-known controversies around 
the interpretation of ‘public body’ in Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, and around the use of various forms of 
‘zeroing’ under the Antidumping Agreement. For an important recent discussion, which calls into question the 
prevailing wisdom that WTO jurisprudential prudential developments have in fact constrained the use of trade 
defences against China, see Zhou and Gao, ‘China’s SOE Reform: Using WTO Rules to Build a Market 
Economy’ 68(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2019) (forthcoming). It is also in part because 
the application of trade defences to Chinese products now in many cases leads only to trade diversion, rather 
than neutralising the underlying competitive threat they pose: see eg, Bown, above n9. On the other side, there is 
the opposite perception – that the rules have for too long unfairly permitted the disproportionate targeting of 
China on account of its institutional choices, which are formally permitted under the rules, and that China is 




The main reason for focussing on this concept here is that it has clearly emerged as a key 
concept in WTO trade defences law to address precisely the problems relating to Chinese 
state capitalism noted above. But it is also worth noting that its use is far more general than 
just the WTO. It has, for example, become very common across a variety of international 
spaces to speak of certain aspects of China’s capitalist model as ‘distorting’ conditions of 
competition in global markets, and on that basis to call them into question.27 Moreover, it has 
become standard across many different regimes of supranational market governance to judge 
the legitimacy of state action in the economy in part by reference to an assessment of the 
degree to which they ‘distort’ market outcomes, or by reference to the cognate concept of 
‘competitive neutrality’.28 The conceptual criticisms that I offer below are quite general, and 
are just as relevant to these domains of governance as to WTO trade remedies law.  
 
The first context in which WTO law has begun to incorporate the notion of a ‘market 
distortion’ is in relation to the application of countervailing duties under the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (‘Subsidies Agreement’). As is well known, in 
certain circumstances, WTO law permits WTO Members to impose countervailing duties to 
offset the adverse effects caused by ‘subsidies’ granted to imported products. Under the 
Subsidies Agreement, a subsidy only exists if it can be shown that a government or public 
body has made a financial contribution, and that a ‘benefit’ has thereby been conferred.29 The 
test for the existence of a benefit is in most cases a market benchmarking test: that is to say, 
whether a benefit has been conferred should normally be determined by assessing whether 
the recipient has received the financial contribution on terms more favourable than those 
available to the recipient in the market.30  
 
Importantly, the ‘market’ in this test is that which exists within the territory of the Member 
alleged to be granting the subsidy, in accordance with the market conditions prevailing in that 
country.31 It is worth highlighting that this is therefore an internal, not external, market 
benchmark test. By ‘internal’, I simply mean that the existence of a subsidy is determined not 
by reference to some universal notion of a ‘true’ market price. Instead, the relevant 
benchmark price is identified by reference to the actually existing markets of the subsidising 
member – the ‘prevailing market conditions’ as they are found ‘in the territory of [the 
                                               
27 See, eg, European Commission, ‘On Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of 
China for the Purposes of Trade Defence Investigations’, Commission Staff Working Document, 19 December 
2017, SWD(2017) 483 final/2, available at  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/december/tradoc_156474.pdf, last accessed 30 September 2019; 
USTR, ‘Findings Of The Investigation Into China’s Acts, Policies, And Practices Related To Technology 
Transfer, Intellectual Property and Innovation under Section 301 Of The Trade Act Of 1974’, 22 March 2018, 
available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF, last accessed 30 September 
2019; OECD, Competitive Neutrality: Maintaining a Level Playing Field between Public and Private Business 
(Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012); OECD, State-Owned Enterprises and the Pinciple of Competitive Neutrality, 
OECD Doc DAF/COMP(2009)37, (Paris: OECD, 2009).  
28 The language has become important, for example, in the context of competition law, state aid, OECD rules 
relating to export subsidies, among others. For one contribution which proceeds from a broader view of the 
importance of this principle generally, see Virtanen and Valkama, ‘Competitive Neutrality and Distortion of 
Competition: A Conceptual View’ 32(3) World Competition 393-407 (2009). 
29 Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), Art 1. 
30 WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (Canada – 
Aircraft), WT/DS70/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999, para 157.  
31 SCM Agreement, Articles 1, 14. Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty 
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada (US – Lumber IV), WT/DS257/AB/R, 
adopted 17 February 2004, para 90ff.  
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exporting] Member’.32 It is accepted that such conditions will legitimately vary from country 
to country, and that therefore so too will the appropriate price benchmark also vary from 
country to country. 
 
It follows from this that, as an evidentiary matter, one would typically first look for private 
prices in the country of provision to establish a benchmark price to be used for market 
comparison. However, a difficulty arises where those domestic market prices are for some 
reason or another unreliable, as evidence of genuine market prices. There is a narrow and a 
broad version of this difficulty. The narrow version is focussed on the problem of circularity 
which arises where a subsidy program in question is so economically significant that it 
impacts the market as a whole, affecting even the prices which private actors offer to one 
another in the ordinary course of business. In some cases, domestic private prices have been 
disregarded as appropriate evidence of the benchmark market price, because the government 
has been found to be so predominant a supplier of the good in question that its actions have 
distorted market prices generally.33  
 
The broader version of the difficulty is more generally focussed on the problem that the 
domestic market might be distorted by government action of whatever form, not just the 
subsidy in question. In a number of relatively recent cases,34 it has been accepted that private 
prices in the domestic market of the exporting members may be disregarded for the purposes 
of the construction of a market benchmark, wherever government intervention causes a price 
distortion:  
 
the central inquiry under Article 14(d) in choosing an appropriate benefit benchmark 
is whether government intervention results in price distortion such that recourse to 
out-of-country prices is warranted, or whether instead in-country prices of private 
enterprises and/or government-related entities are market-determined and can 
therefore serve as a basis for determining the existence of benefit. Thus, what would 
allow an investigating authority to reject in-country prices is a finding of price 
distortion resulting from government intervention in the market.35 
 
Where domestic markets are so distorted, then evidence of prices in other markets may be 
used to establish a market benchmark.36 These may include world prices, or prices from 
markets in other countries or regions which are comparable. Importantly, this is an 
evidentiary matter only: it does not change the fact that the benchmark test is still a 
fundamentally internal one. The relevant market to be used for the benefit test, that is to say, 
is still the domestic market of the subsidising Member – as it would be in the absence of the 
                                               
32 SCM Agreement, Article 14.  
33 Appellate Body Report, US – Lumber IV, above n31, para 100 and surrounding. 
34 Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China (US – AD/CVD), WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 25 March 2011, para. 429ff; Appellate Body 
Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India 
(US – Carbon Steel (India)), WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted 19 December 2014, para. 4.155 and surrounding; Panel 
Report, United States–Antidumping and Countervailing Measures on Certain Coated Paper from Indonesia (US 
– Coated Paper), WT/DS491/R, adopted 22 January 2018; Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China (US – CVD (China)), WT/DS437/AB/R, 
adopted 16 January 2015, para. 4.50 and surrounding; Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing 
Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by China (US – CVD 
(China)(21.5)), WT/DS437/AB/RW, adopted 15 August 2019, para 5.137ff. 
35 Appellate Body Report, US – CVDs (China)(21.5), above n34, para 5.141. 
36 Eg, ibid.  
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distorting interventions of that Member.37 Prices from other markets are used solely as an aid 
to determine what prices the domestic market might produce, in the absence of that 
distortion. It follows that an adjustment ought to be made to take into account the differences 
in relevant market conditions between the foreign or world markets, on one hand, and the 
domestic market in question (absent the relevant distortions), on the other.38  
 
This line of jurisprudence is quite general, and in principle not confined to any particular 
subset of WTO Members. However, it is important to note that this special method for 
calculating the appropriate market benchmark may be more readily applicable to China, by 
virtue of Section 15(b) of its Accession Protocol.39 
 
The second context in which the concept of market distortions is important is in the 
application of the Antidumping Agreement, and the story behind its emergence here has been 
told in detail elsewhere.40 The legal framework is different from that applicable to 
countervailing duties, but it involves comparable moves. WTO Members are permitted to 
impose antidumping to counteract the injurious effects of ‘dumping’, and ‘dumping’ occurs 
when the export price of a product is below its normal value, where normal value is 
understood to mean the price of the like product when sold in the domestic market in the 
ordinary course of trade.41 The calculation of a dumping margin for a product, then, involves 
a comparison between the export price of a good, and its market value in the domestic market 
of the export country. 
 
Unlike the subsidies context, where it is a relatively recent development, it has been 
recognised for a very long time in the antidumping context that there are some circumstances 
in which actual domestic transactions may be treated as an unreliable indication of the 
                                               
37 Eg, Panel Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products 
from China (US – AD/CVDs), WT/DS379/R, adopted 25 March 2011, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS379/AB/R, para 10.187. 
38 Appellate Body Report, US – Lumber IV, above n31, paras 89, 96, 106, 108; Appellate Body Report, US – 
Carbon Steel (India), above n34, para 4.158; Panel Report, US – AD/CVDs, above n37, para 10.187. 
39 China Accession Protocol, above n16, section 15(b): ‘In proceedings under Parts II, III and V of the SCM 
Agreement, when addressing subsidies described in Articles 14(a), 14(b), 14(c) and 14(d), relevant provisions of 
the SCM Agreement shall apply;  however, if there are special difficulties in that application, the importing 
WTO Member may then use methodologies for identifying and measuring the subsidy benefit which take into 
account the possibility that prevailing terms and conditions in China may not always be available as appropriate 
benchmarks.  In applying such methodologies, where practicable, the importing WTO Member should adjust 
such prevailing terms and conditions before considering the use of terms and conditions prevailing outside 
China’. 
40 For a selection of the relevant literature, see, eg, Shadikhodjaev, ‘Non-Market Economies, Significant Market 
Distortions, and the 2017 EU Anti-Dumping Amendment’, 21(4) Journal of International Economic Law 885-
905 (2018); Shadikhodjaev, ‘Input Cost Adjustments and WTO Anti-Dumping Law: A Closer Look at the EU 
Practice’, 18(1) World Trade Review 81-107 (2019); Kluttig, Tietje and Franke, ‘Cost of Production 
Adjustments in Anti-Dumping Proceedings: Challenging the Raw Material Inputs Dual Pricing Systems in EU 
Anti-dumping Law and Practice’, 45(5) Journal of World Trade 1071-1102 (2011); Vermulst, Sud and Evenett, 
‘Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against China Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less Equal Than 
Others?’ 11(5) Global Trade and Customs Journal 212–228 (2016); Du, above n3; Bown, above n9; Zhou, 
‘Appellate Body Report on EU-Biodiesel: The Future of China’s State Capitalism under the WTO Anti-
Dumping Agreement’, 17(4) World Trade Review 609 (2018); Noel and Zhou, ‘Replacing the Non-Market 
Economy Methodology: Is the European Union’s Alternative Approach Justified under the World Trade 
Organization Anti-Dumping Agreement?’, 11-12 Global Trade and Customs Law 559 (2016); Bungenberg et al. 
(eds.), The Future of Trade Defence Instruments: Global Policy Trends and Legal Challenges (Switzerland: 
Springer, 2018).  
41 Uruguay Round Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(Anti-Dumping Agreement), Article 2.1. 
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genuine domestic market price (‘normal value’). One of these circumstances, which arose 
historically in the context of trade with Eastern bloc countries, is where the exporting country 
is a so-called ‘non-market economy’ (NME). In such cases, it was recognised, as early as the 
mid-1950s, that a special methodology for calculating normal value may be appropriate, and 
the differential treatment of NMEs has been an accepted feature of antidumping practice from 
that time until very recently. 42 As is well known, a condition of China’s accession to the 
WTO was its agreement that other WTO Members may – in certain circumstances, and for a 
specified period – treat it presumptively as a non-market economy for the purposes of 
antidumping proceedings, and apply this special methodology.43 Though at the time of 
writing there is some doubt,44 it was widely expected for some time that this special 
antidumping regime for China would cease to apply from December 2016.  
 
In part as a consequence, an interpretation of the Antidumping Agreement has emerged, 
which, it is argued, may permit the use of a similar special methodology for calculating 
normal value in more general circumstances. The claim is simply that domestic transactions 
are unreliable indications of true (market-based) ‘normal value’ wherever the relevant 
domestic market is heavily distorted. In such circumstances, it is argued, the Antidumping 
Agreement permits WTO Members to calculate normal value using an alternative 
methodology, based either on export prices to third countries, or to costs of production in the 
country of origin. 45 Furthermore, where this alternative method uses costs of production in 
the country of origin, there has also been an effort to introduce the notion of distortions a 
second time. That is to say, it has been argued that, where domestic costs of production are 
‘distorted’ – because the domestic input markets are themselves distorted by state 
intervention – then WTO Members are permitted to use corrected prices in their dumping 
calculations. The legality of this latter practice, however, is doubtful in light of recent 
jurisprudence.46  
 
The upshot is that, under the Subsidies Agreement, and potentially also the Antidumping 
Agreement, the existence of a ‘market distortion’ in the exporting country can indirectly 
trigger a right to impose duties on products imported from that country, and/or fundamentally 
affect the way that they are calculated. Broadly speaking, then, we can say that WTO law 
distinguishes between at least three different situations. First, there are certain forms of state 
action which are expressly prohibited by the operation of various WTO agreements (not 
discussed above). Second, partially overlapping with the first category but mostly quite 
distinct from it, there are certain forms of state action which count as ‘distortions’ of 
domestic markets and which therefore justify the imposition of duties on importation. The 
underlying idea here is that these actions creates competitive advantages for exports which 
                                               
42 See GATT 1994, Ad note Article VI:1(2): ‘ It is recognized that, in the case of imports from a country which 
has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the 
State, special difficulties may exist in determining price comparability for the purposes of paragraph 1, and in 
such cases importing contracting parties may find it necessary to take into account the possibility that a strict 
comparison with domestic prices in such a country may not always be appropriate.’ 
43 China Accession Protocol, above n16, section 15(a).  
44 As noted above, at time of writing, proceedings have been suspended in European Union — Measures 
Related to Price Comparison Methodologies, DS516, which effectively permits the continued use of an NME 
methodology against China at least for the present.  
45 For example, such domestic transactions may not be ‘in the ordinary course of trade’, or there may be a 
‘particular market situation’, or there may be in too low a volume of sales in the domestic market: Anti-
Dumping Agreement, Articles 2.1, 2.2. 
46 See, eg, Appellate Body Report, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina 
(EU – Biodiesel (Argentina)), WT/DS473/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 26 October 2016.  
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can permissibly be treated as ‘unfair’ and which therefore can be offset if desired.47 Third, 
there are certain kinds of state actions which are neither prohibited, nor treated as justifying 
corrective duties of any kind, but represent simply the background institutional conditions of 
market activity which states and their populations are free to establish as they see fit. It 
follows that the precise way in which ‘distortions’ are defined, identified, and quantified for 
the purposes of WTO law has an important bearing on the content of each of these three 
groups – in particular on the boundary between the second and third.  As a consequence, it is 
one of the key legal concepts on which hangs the approach of the international trade regime 
to the question of the appropriate limits of institutional diversity and experimentation more 
generally. 
 
Given this significance, it is important to ask whether this concept can actually adequately 
perform the function that is being asked of it? For this purpose, in the next section, I step 
back to consider (or indeed reconsider) some of the more conceptual difficulties associated 
with the application of the concept of ‘market distortion’ in a legal context. I shall return in 
the subsequent section to offer some more detailed thoughts on the case law briefly 
summarised above, where it will be my claim that the problems in the jurisprudence stem in 
part from inadequately recognising these conceptual difficulties.  
 
 
4. Distinguishing ‘distortions’ from ‘background institutional conditions’ 
 
One of the debates familiar to scholars working in the field of US countervailing duty law, 
concerns whether or not it is possible to identify objectionable foreign subsidies by singling 
out those which ‘distort’ the efficient allocation of resources. As long ago as 1972, Schwartz 
and Harper argued that such a ‘distortion’ test was inoperable and incoherent, for three 
primary reasons. First, subsidies will not be distortive where they internalise externalities, 
and externalities are so pervasive as to be incalculable. Second, subsidies may represent the 
efficient pursuit of what may now be called ‘non-economic’ public preferences, which 
preferences cannot adequately be taken into account in a distortion analysis. Third, subsidies 
may offset other governmental burdens, and the practical difficulties of conducting a 
comprehensive ‘netting’ of all governmental actions are insurmountable.48 As a result of their 
analysis, the idea that ‘distortion’ analysis is fundamentally ‘incomplete’ is now well 
accepted, and a variety of attempts have been made to re-ground countervailing duty law on 
different theoretical grounds.49 In similar but not identical terms, Tarullo has argued against 
                                               
47 I am grateful to Weihuan Zhou for the observation that there is a degree of incoherence in antidumping 
context here, because if the institutional choice of a foreign government can properly be said to cause an unfair 
distortion, why should the pricing practices of private parties be relevant? Why, in other words, should only 
those sales which can be characterized as ‘dumping’ be offset, rather than all sales affected by the unfair 
distortion?  
48 Schwartz and Harper, ‘The Regulation of Subsidies Affecting International Trade’ 70 Michigan Law Review 
831 (1972). See also Goetz, Granet and Schwartz, ‘The Meaning of ‘Subsidy’ and ‘Injury’ in the Countervailing 
Duty Law’ 6(1) International Review of Law and Economics 17 (1986).  
49 See, for a selection, Barcelo, ‘Subsidies and Countervailing Duties – Analysis and a Proposal’, 4 Law and 
Policy of International Business 779 (1977)Diamond, ‘A Search for Economic and Financial Principles in the 
Administration of United States Countervailing Duty Law’, 21 Law and Policy of International Business 507 
(1990); Trebilcock, ‘Is the Game Worth the Candle – Comments on a Search for Economic and Financial 
Principles in the Administration of United States Countervailing Duty Law’, 21 Law and Policy of International 
Business 723 (1990); Alford, ‘When is China Paraguay? An Examination of the Application of the Antidumping 
and Countervailing Duty Law of the United States to China and Other Nonmarket Economy Nations’ 61 
Southern California Law Review 79 (1987); Tarullo, n25; Lantz, ‘The Search for Consistency: Treatment of 
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what he has called the ‘market correction’ norm in US countervailing duty law, according to 
which the role of such law is to correct for market distortions introduced by foreign 
government subsidies. The application of this norm, he has argued, not only entails 
impossible calculations if it is to be done rigorously, but also (as a consequence) leads in 
practice to investigating authorities imposing countervailing duties in ways which discipline 
deviation from an (implicit) understanding of ‘normal’ market relations.50 Writing in the 
same year, Alford provided a similarly incisive criticism of the ‘market/non-market’ 
distinction as the justification for differential treatment in the context of antidumping and 
countervailing duty law.51 
 
It will be clear that the arguments I make in this section and the next have been deeply 
influenced by this literature, and overlap considerably with some of it. In my view, the 
lessons of this literature have been only very inadequately internalised into thinking about 
WTO trade remedies law, particularly in the context of US-China relations.52 That said, the 
argument I make is articulated quite differently, and that is so for a very specific reason. The 
question at issue here is not whether a particular subsidy can properly be characterised as 
‘distortive’, but rather whether a foreign country’s economy can properly be regarded as 
‘distorted’. In that context, I shall be arguing that any coherent answer to this question must 
involve making a distinction between ‘market distortions’ and ‘background institutional 
conditions’. This distinction is not central to the above literature, certainly not explicitly. 
Furthermore, my way of drawing that distinction crucially incorporates an understanding of 
the role of institutions in economy life which has only clearly emerged since the late 1990s,53 
and which may or may not be shared by the earlier writers on which I drawing. In addition, I 
shall be arguing that this distinction is not just incomplete but deeply contested, and that as a 
consequence it is not the sort of distinction which is amenable to clear and final demarcation 
by international judicial tribunals by reference to definitive normative or logical principles. 
This colours what I will have to say in Section 6 on ‘solutions’. Again, this claim is present in 
some of the literature referred to above, but is often left unsaid – primarily because the 
purpose of that literature, once ‘distortion’ analysis has been discarded as incoherent, is often 
to find an alternative theoretical basis for trade remedies.  
 
What, then, do we mean when we talk about ‘market distortions’? Broadly speaking, we say 
that a particular governmental action is a ‘market distortion’ when it affects market 
behaviours, prices or outcomes in a way which makes them different from what they would 
                                               
Nonmarket Economies in Transition Under United States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws’, 10(3) 
American University International Law Review 993 (1995). 
50 Tarullo, above n25.  
51 Alford, above n49. 
52 Some literature which does do so, includes, (probably most prominently) Sykes, ‘The Questionable Case for 
Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective’, 2(2) Journal of Legal Analysis 473 (2010); Langille, 
‘General Reflections on the Relationship of Trade and Labor (Or: Fair Trade is Free Trade’s Destiny)’ in 
Bhagwati and Hudec (eds), Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1996); Gagne, ‘Policy Diversity, State Autonomy, and the US-Canada Softwood Lumber Dispute: 
Philosophical and Normative Aspects’, 41(4) Journal of World Trade 699 (2007); Qin, ‘Market Benchmarks 
and Government Monopoly: The Case of Land and Natural Resources under Global Subsidies Regulation’, 40 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 575 (2019); also related is Zheng, ‘The Pitfalls of the 
(Perfect) Market Benchmark: The Case of Countervailing Duty Law’, 19(1) Minnesota Journal of International 
Law 1 (2010). See also generally, some of the concerns expressed in WTO, Committee on Anti-Dumping 
Practices – Minutes of the Regular Meeting Held on 27 April 2017, G/ADP/M/52, 28 July 2017, paras 7.1ff, as 
well as subsequent meetings of the same Committee. 
53 See above nn7,17-18. 
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have been if they were ‘market-determined’.54 Importantly, however, this does not include all 
governmental actions which affect market outcomes in some way, at least not in its ordinary 
usage. For example, most of us would distinguish between governmental acts which ‘distort’ 
markets, and those which ‘regulate’ markets.55 Of course, it may be that, if they are poorly 
designed in one way or another, we may begin to talk about them as distortions, but in the 
absence of that sort of problem we are more likely to think of this sort of governmental acts 
as either correcting market failures, or simply ‘regulating’ markets in the public interest.  
 
In addition, and more importantly for the purposes of the present argument, we also tend to 
distinguish between governmental acts which distort markets and governmental acts which 
‘enable’ markets to function.56 For example, where a market is subject to rules which prohibit 
cartels, or grant legal personality and limited liability to corporations, or define the length of 
patent terms, or establish rights of minority shareholders, we would not for that reason only 
speak of these markets as ‘distorted’. Although we might disagree on the appropriate content 
of the rules necessary to enable markets to function properly, very few of us would suggest 
that the mere presence of these types of rules renders the market they govern ‘distorted’. 
Finally, most of us also tend implicitly to hold another category of governmental actions in 
our heads, namely those which merely exist in the ‘background’ of market relations. For 
example, in relation to the market for automobiles in a particular country, most of us would 
not think of rules relating to succession, adoption, water quality, the sale of health insurance 
or zoning as ‘distortions’ of that market, but rather as simply the background to it, or the 
context in which it operates. This is so even though these rules may well, and in fact often do, 
have profound economy-wide impacts on market behaviour and market prices, in some 
diffuse and hard to track, but still very real, way. 
 
It is not only that we do make such distinctions in our ordinary language and ways of 
thinking, it is also that we have to make distinctions of this sort, even if only implicitly, if we 
want to identify market distortions in a coherent manner. This is true in at least three senses. 
First, it is necessary as a practical matter, wherever a situated claim is made that a particular 
measure actually distorts a real-world market. However complicated or involved that claim 
is, there will always be in practice some rules which are taken for granted for the purposes of 
analysis. Second, it is necessary as a logical matter, because otherwise one very quickly runs 
into absurdity. The alternative to making distinctions of this type is to treat every 
governmental action (contrary to our ordinary ways of speaking) as in principle a distortion, 
or at least potentially distortive. There is no logical limit.57 Third, it is necessary as a 
normative matter, wherever the claim that a governmental measure is distortive is made (as it 
almost always is) as part of an argument for remedial action of some type – such as removing 
it, modifying it, compensating for it, and so on. This is because it is a basic assumption of all 
our real-world political discourse about market discourse that states can legitimately set the 
basic framework and background conditions for markets, at least to some degree. We always 
                                               
54 The terms takes on shades of meaning which derive, in part, from different ways of understanding what is 
meant by ‘market-determined’ behaviours, outcomes and prices. Sometimes, especially in technical discourse, 
we mean those behaviours, outcomes and prices which would be produced in a perfectly competitive market. 
Sometimes we mean those behaviours, outcomes and prices which would be produced a market which is 
characterised by some looser notion of ‘free and fair’ competition. And sometimes we simply mean those 
behaviours which would have been produced by the market in the absence of that governmental act – that is to 
say, something is a market distortion if it changes what market participants would otherwise do. 
55 It is also possible, though uncommon, to conceptualise bona fide regulations for a public purpose as ‘justified 
distortions’. As it happens nothing turns on that for the purpose of the present argument.  
56 For another way of expressing this point, see Tarullo, above n25, at 553, 558-9.  
57 Langille, above n52, at 247; Tarullo, above n25.  
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agree that there are some rules which are compatible with the principle of ‘free and fair’ 
competition in a particular market, even if we might disagree which ones they are. The 
distinction between rules which ‘distort’ markets, and those which are ‘enabling’ or in the 
‘background’, expresses this common assumption. 
 
In the remainder of this paper, I will lump together the categories of ‘enabling’ and 
‘background’ rules, and speak of them generally as part of the ‘institutional conditions’ of a 
market. (Nothing turns on the distinction between these two categories for the purposes of my 
argument.) The first step in my argument is that when we try to ascertain whether a particular 
measure constitutes a market distortion – or whether a market is distorted – we need in 
principle to ask whether or not the measure in question is better understood as part of the 
institutional conditions of the market. If the measure does more properly fall into that 
category, it ought not to be described as a distortion of that market at all. This process of 
characterisation is in principle distinct from (even if it is related to) the question of to what 
extent and in what ways the measure makes market outcomes different from what they would 
otherwise have been.  
 
Another way of putting this point is that the existence of a market ‘distortion’ can only ever 
be determined by way of a comparison with a baseline ‘undistorted’ (or less distorted) 
market, and that this baseline market is always and necessarily a product of a particular set of 
institutions.58 The trick is working out whether the state action in question should be treated 
as part of the institutional baseline, or as an addition to it. So stated, it is clear that this is one 
version of the broader ‘baseline’ problem very familiar to other fields of legal enquiry.59 
 
In the remainder of this paper, I shall take it as entirely uncontroversial, at least as an abstract 
proposition and a matter of principle, that governments can perfectly legitimately help to 
establish these institutional conditions, and indeed always do so, regardless of the position we 
take on the justifiability of market distortions. Institutional diversity which results from such 
choices is a normal, pervasive and broadly positive feature of the global economic order. The 
proposition that governments can and do ‘set the institutional conditions’ of markets is 
equivalent to the idea, expressed by others,60 that governments can and do set the 
‘parameters’ within which market competition takes place. I prefer the language of setting 
‘background conditions’, however, because ‘setting parameters’ can lead to an important 
confusion. It can seem to imply that the institutional context merely sets limits and 
boundaries to competition, or exogenous constraints within which market forces act. This 
would be a misunderstanding. In fact, we should imagine the work of the legal rules which 
form part of the institutional context in a different way. They are endogenous to market 
relations: such rules define the objects of competition, they establish the meaning and 
methods of fair competition, they make available certain opportunities and resources to 
economic actors, they facilitate certain business strategies and strategies of interfirm 
cooperation, and so on. The work they do already presumed by, and contained in, the notion 
of ‘market competition’, rather than a set of limits on it. This is what is meant here by the 
claim that markets are institutionally embedded.61  
                                               
58 For a clear expression of this point, see Vanberg, The Constitution of Markets: Essays in Political Economy 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 21. 
59 A classic statement is Sunstein, ‘Lochner’s Legacy’, 87 Columbia Law Review 873 (1987). 
60 See n82 below, and accompanying text. 
61 It will be clear to those who are familiar with the very schools of institutionalism that I am taking a specific 
position here in debates within that field. I am setting out here what Jackson and Deeg call the comparative 




This is an important point to clarify because it helps to forestall another potential 
misunderstanding. It is very common, particularly in discussions about diversity of national 
economic system in global trade, to categorise different forms of market capitalism along a 
continuum which is either ‘closer to’ or ‘more distant from’ an imagined form of ‘pure’ free 
market capitalism. From this perspective, the question of what degree of institutional 
diversity should be permitted by the global trade regime often is heard as the question of how 
far from ‘pure’ market capitalism should its Members be permitted to depart? But it follows 
from what has just been said that this way of categorizing economic systems can only go so 
far, and is an inadequate lens through which to understand certain differences between 
economic systems. Some differences at the level of institutional conditions (in the sense 
defined above) can affect the nature of market competition, but not its degree. That is to say, 
some institutional differences have a crucial constitutive62 influence over the nature, 
dynamics and methods of competition in the markets they govern – and indeed therefore over 
the prices and outcomes produced by these markets – but they do so, or can in principle do 
so, in a manner perfectly consistent with perfectly free competition.63 They produce very 
different markets, but the differences between them are not best understood in the language 
of ‘more or less competition’ or ‘more or less freedom’. If the claim that governments are 
free to set the institutional conditions for markets it to mean anything, it must mean – at a 
minimum – that these sorts of institutional choices remain entirely for each Member to 
determine for itself. 
 
The next question is how – by reference to what criteria and principles, or by what alternative 
method – can any particular governmental measure be characterised as either a ‘distortion’ or 
part of the ‘background institutional conditions’ of a market? One very common method is 
what we might call the ‘but-for’ effects test. According to this method, a governmental act 
counts as a distortion if one can show that it affects market prices, making them different 
from what they would otherwise be. It will be clear already, from what has been said above, 
why this is conceptually flawed, at least when stated so baldly. It is a method which can be 
applied to any governmental act, without logical limit, as long as it has some price impact, no 
matter how diffuse, general or unpredictable.64 It provides no real way of isolating distortions 
from background institutional conditions, because even the latter will often deeply affect 
market behaviours. Think, for example, what difference it would make to the price of credit if 
limited liability corporations did not exist, or to patterns of corporate ownership if minority 
shareholder protections were strengthened.  
 
In truth, however, application the ‘but for’ effects test is always accompanied by one choice, 
and one assumption, which do a lot of the analytical work. The choice is the decision which 
measure to analyse as a potential distortion. The assumption is that the rules governing the 
market used as the comparison in the ‘but-for’ test are all properly characterised as 
background ‘institutional conditions’. As Tarullo has argued persuasively, when such choices 
and assumptions are made implicitly, they tend in practice to rely on an unspecified set of 
                                               
62 On different meaning of ‘constitutive’ in this context, see Lang, ‘Market Anti-naturalisms’ in Desautels-Stein 
and Tomlins (eds), Searching for Contemporary Legal Thought (CUP, 2017), at 312-329.  
63 Or, equivalently, we at least we need to conceptually distinguish between the influence of a measure on the 
nature of competition and its role in restricting or interfering with competition (if, as may be the case, the two 
tend to go together). Vanberg’s way of putting this distinction is that between the ‘how’ and the ‘how much’ of 
competition; see Vanberg, above n58, fn 17 to Chapter 1. 
64 See also Langille, above n52; Gagne, above n52.  
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ideas of what constitute ‘normal’ market relations.65 ‘Normal’ here might mean ‘what 
governments generally do’, or ‘what governments tend to do in the markets with which I am 
familiar’, or ‘what governments do in what I think of as a perfectly free market’, or 
something else again. Such ideas are sometimes conscious, sometimes not, but of course they 
are always ideological, in the most general sense of that word. In some contexts, this does not 
really matter.66 But it is self-evidently deficient as an approach where precisely what is at 
stake is a difference of opinion as to what constitutes ‘normality’ – or where the fairness of 
conditions of competition in the market as a whole are precisely what is at issue. In such 
cases, the precise ways in which one characterises governmental acts – as enabling, 
corrective, background, distortive, and so on – will inevitably be made visible and contested, 
and as a consequence must be defended as a matter of principle. This is of course precisely 
the case in the context of international trade governance, and it is the reason why a bare 
bones application of a ‘but for’ effects test is inadequate in that context. 
 
There are many other ways in which we might instinctively seek to justify the distinctions we 
draw between different types of governmental measures, not by reference to their effects, but 
as a matter of principle. Some might, for example, be more likely to characterise a measure as 
part of the background institutional conditions of a market when its effects on market 
behaviour are general, or diffuse, or indirect. Others might draw the distinction based in part 
on the degree of coerciveness of the measure. Others still may see as relevant the intention of 
the measure: was it intended to favour some market participants over others, or was this 
outcome reasonably foreseeable? Or we might have recourse to the perceptions of 
participants in the market in question: do they tend to see it as part of the institutional 
background, or an interference with their choices? Or we might treat measures differently 
depending on whether they affect consumers’ real (authentic) preference rankings?67 More 
likely, we may choose some combination of these, or indeed others. Each of them is 
plausible, each has its difficulties, and each is associated one way or another with different 
philosophical traditions of thinking about what ‘market freedom’ and ‘fair competition’ can 
and should mean. The simple point I want to make for the purposes of my argument here is 
that once we start down the path of making and justifying these distinctions, then certain 
serious difficulties arise, which are of particular concern in the context of international trade 
governance in general, and WTO dispute settlement in particular. I will mention just three of 
them. 
 
First, while each of the above-stated criteria are plausible in the abstract, they face 
considerable conceptual difficulties in their application, which will not be able to be ignored 
in the rigorous context of judicial dispute settlement between states. Take, for example, the 
Hayekian distinction between general and specific measures which is often used to help 
distinguish between enabling rules and distorting interventions. On one hand, the generality 
of a measure is often an unreliable guide to its competitive impacts. As has long been noted, 
facially general measures can have very specific competitive effects – and indeed are often 
implemented in practice in full knowledge of them. A tax law providing for accelerated 
                                               
65 Tarullo, above n25. 
66 Amongst those who share a broadly similar vision of what is ‘normal’, for example, this approach can be 
mostly unobjectionable, which may be why it is so often adopted uncritically in domestic policy discourse. And 
it may also not matter tremendously in the context of a debate in which all participants share the view that an 
existing market functions well, is characterised by essentially free and fair competition, or for other substantive 
reasons should as far as possible be kept as it is. 




depreciation for machinery in use for more than 12 hours a day may in practice benefit very 
specific sectors or companies.68 It is also worth noting that many of the rules and institutions 
in place in the Chinese economy, and challenged as distortive, are general in nature.69 
Conversely, specific measures are sometimes best understood as instantiations of broader 
unstated principles. Is a government-sponsored worker retraining program servicing a local 
aeronautical company a specific favour to that company or best seen as part of a broader 
collection of social protections for displaced workers? For Tarullo, this difficulty is so 
pervasive that ‘nearly any government program may be plausibly characterized as either 
‘generally available’ or specifically targeted.’70 Similar criticisms have also been made of the 
distinction between coercive and non-coercive measures.71 
 
Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, another difficulty is not so much that it is 
impossible to draw a distinction between different kinds of governmental acts in a principled 
manner. The deeper point, rather, is that this is self-evidently the stuff of politics, and as such 
hardly the sort of thing which amenable to judicial pronouncement – particularly at the 
international level, and particularly in the fraught context of trade. The choice of which 
principle to use is ultimately a choice between different understandings of what markets are 
and what kinds of laws are compatible with their existence. The more that international trade 
dispute settlement panels are asked to draw boundaries around the concept of ‘market 
distortions’, the more they will necessarily find themselves forced to take a view on heavily 
(and essentially) contested understandings of what sorts of law are compatible with market 
relations. Determining whether or not a certain measure counts as a market ‘distortion’ 
sometimes turns out not only to be a basis on which to determine its fairness, but just as much 
way of expressing a judgment about its fairness, based on a particular understanding of 
market relations and fair market competition.  
 
Third, the proper characterisation of a measure depends in part on where you stand. This is so 
in at least two important senses. First, it depends on your analytical frame of reference. Take, 
for example, a government measure providing subsidies for certain consumers for the 
purchase of health insurance, or providing for government-funded alternatives to employer-
funded health care. If one takes the market for health insurance as one’s frame of reference 
this will be characterised by most as an ‘intervention’ or ‘distortion’ (whether justified or not , 
views will differ). But if one’s frame of reference is, say, the market for automobiles, then 
most would, I suspect, see this as simply part of the background in which the market operates 
– notwithstanding the fact that, in principle at least, such a measure might have a profound 
effect on the cost and availability of a skilled workforce for the automobile sector over the 
long term. The point is a general one: what counts as a distortion of one market may not 
count as a distortion of another market (even where it has clear effects in both markets), such 
that it is often not possible to characterise any particular measure as one or the other in any 
decisive or final way. Second, what counts as a distortion can also depend on the institutional 
context in which the question is posed. For example, it is not uncommon in tax policy debates 
to treat the entire tax system as distortive in some manner or another, and to ask the question 
                                               
68 I take this example from Tarullo, above n25, at 562. 
69 Take, for example, the complaints which have been made regarding China’s currency policy, corporate 
governance system and intellectual property rules. There is no guarantee that a measure which is implemented 
to enable market competition does so in a non-discriminatory or neutral manner.  
70 Tarullo, above n25, at 561. 
71 For one view, see Hale, ‘Coercion and distribution in a supposedly non-coercive state’, 38 Political Science 
Quarterly 470-494 (1923); Hale, ‘Force and the state: a comparison of ‘political’ and ‘economic’ compulsion,” 
35 Columbia Law Review 149-201 (1935); Hale, ‘Bargaining, duress, and economic liberty’, 43 Columbia Law 
Review 603-628 (1943). 
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how its basic principles might be designed to minimise its distortive impact. In the context of 
international trade governance, however, it has been firmly established that it is each 
Member’s sovereign right to choose the basic principles on which its tax policy is 
established, and that (for the purposes of WTO law), these basic principles cannot be treated 
as distortive subsidies, but rather as the background conditions against which global trade 
takes place.72 Again, the point is general: in reality, what properly counts as a market 
distortion for the purposes of international trade governance, is inseparably and inevitably 
linked to the question of what is properly inside and outside the institutional mandate and 
competence of the WTO. 
 
The point of setting out these difficulties is not to encourage us to simply throw up our hands. 
It may be that they are insoluble as a conceptual matter, though as I shall make clearer below, 
they may yet be amenable to a more modest ambition of ‘good enough’ management. 
Nevertheless, it seems to me tremendously important to set such conceptual and normative 
problems out clearly and explicitly, because without a keen awareness of them, the 
application of the concept of ‘distortion’ is almost certain to lead to real problems – for the 
law, and consequently for the trade regime more generally. 
 
One risk is that of incoherence and arbitrariness. Without clear and explicit reasoning on 
some of the above questions, the choices made about what does and does not constitute a 
‘distortion’ are almost certain to be impenetrable to those whose actions the law seeks to 
guide and constrain. Another risk, and perhaps the more important one, is that of chauvinism. 
By this I mean that, without a clear understanding of the problems set out above, and without 
the careful reflexivity they demand, judicial decision-makers are likely to be guided in their 
interpretation of the notion of ‘distortion’ either by their own implicit assumptions about 
what ‘normal’ markets look like, or (more likely) by their perceptions of what WTO 
Members as a whole consider to be ‘normal’ market relations. The risk, of course, is of a 
system which treats Members asymmetrically, depending on their distance from what are 
perceived to be orthodox market institutions at any particular time. The great danger to avoid 
here is that of normalization.73 The risk, that is to say, is to approach the question with an 
implicit vision of ‘normal’ or ‘ideal’ market relations – and to construct a set of rules which 
operates in practice to discipline deviations from this normal or ideal model. This would be 
problematic for many reasons, but mostly because it would normatively privilege certain 
kinds of market models over others, without a clear, or indeed any explicit, justification in 
either economic theory or shared political values. 
 
 
5. Selected problems in the current jurisprudence 
 
In this section, I argue that these risks are already beginning to manifest in the law of the 
WTO. Both WTO and domestic jurisprudence applying the concept of market distortions is 
in its infancy, but already it is beset by serious difficulties. I will briefly mention four by way 
of illustration. All of them, I would argue, stem from an inadequate theorised, or at the very 
least inadequately articulated, understanding of the institutionally embedded character of 
markets.  
 
                                               
72 See generally, Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations", 
WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted 20 March 2000. 
73 For a classic statement of this risk in the context of the application of trade defences, see Tarullo, n25.  
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a. ‘Kitchen-sink-ism’: all government action is ‘intervention’, and all ‘intervention’ is 
potentially distorting 
 
One problem has been the use of what I shall call ‘kitchen-sink-ism’. This is the approach 
according to which, in order to characterise a market as distorted, one simply catalogues all 
the governmental actions which can plausibly be said to have an impact on prices and 
competitive in that market, relying on their sheer number and aggregated weight to make a 
determination that a market is relevantly distorted. It involves no explicit attempt to 
distinguish between ‘distortions’ and background ‘institutional conditions’, instead lumping 
them all together in a single category. 
 
A few examples are worth briefly citing, to give a flavour. One is the EU’s voluminous 
country report on China, ‘On Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s 
Republic of China for the Purposes of Trade Defence Investigations’.74 As noted above, the 
EU’s new antidumping regime permits the disregard of domestic prices or costs in the 
calculation of normal value where there are ‘significant distortions’ in the market of the 
exporting country.75 In determining whether such distortions exist, the Commission must 
consider a range of factors, including: the significant presence of state-owned or –controlled 
enterprises; state interference in firm pricing decision or influence over costs; public policies 
which discriminate or ‘otherwise influenc[e] free market forces’; inadequate bankruptcy, 
corporate or property laws, distorted wages; and the presence of credit institutions which 
implement public policy objectives or otherwise are not independent of the state. 
Accordingly, the European Commission’s country report on China, issued in accordance with 
its new rules identifies a huge array of sources of distortion in the Chinese economy as a 
whole, ranging from state and party involvement in corporate management, the basic legal 
structure of ‘socialist market economy’, the risk assessment practices of financial firms, 
preferential government procurement practices, mechanisms for allocating land, investment 
screening systems, divergence of Chinese labour laws and practices from fundamental 
international labour standards, as well as a wide range of sector-specific policies, from 
research and development subsidies, preferential loans to favoured enterprises, export 
restrictions and incentives, tax incentives, land use cost relief, employment stabilisation 
plans, and much more.  
 
Other examples can readily be found in other jurisdictions. For example, in a number of 
proceedings, the USDOC concluded that Chinese interest rates were distorted, and could not 
be used as reliable indications of the interest rates which would be established by a 
functioning market.76 This determination rested on a large catalogue of factor including that 
the primary shareholder in the largest banks continued to be the government of China and 
foreign ownership remained restricted; privately owned Chinese banks had a very small 
market share; corporate governance reform in the banking sector had not been fully 
implemented; Chinese banks were required to take into consideration government 
macroeconomic policies in their lending decisions; they lacked adequate independent risk 
                                               
74 European Commission, above n27.  
75 See paragraph 6a to Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2321 of 12 December 2017 amending Regulation 
(EU) 2016/1036 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union and 
Regulation 2016/1037 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European 
Union.  
76 See, for example, the range of investigations at issue in Panel Report, US – AD/CVDs, above n37, which in 
return relied in significant part on the United States’ 2007 Coated Free Sheet Paper investigation, as well as the 
earlier Lined Paper investigation.   
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management capacities; lending rates by Chinese banks were largely undifferentiated; and 
that the Chinese government directly regulated deposit and lending rates.77 Similarly, in other 
proceedings, the USDOC rejected domestic Chinese land prices as an appropriate benchmark 
on the basis that Chinese markets for industrial law were distorted, citing a number of factors: 
that the Chinese government was the ultimate owner of all land; that government authorities 
‘controlled the supply and allocation of land that could be used by non-[SOEs] for non-
agricultural purposes’; that land use rights were in general poorly defined and weakly 
enforced; that local governments ‘had often exercised broad and unrestricted powers to 
expropriate land’, that in practice land use rights were ‘transferred via "closed-door" 
negotiations and not via public auctions, tenders or listings as required by law’.78 
 
For present purposes, the problem with these assessments is not their conclusions, but the 
manner in which they are carried out, and in particular their failure to distinguish between 
those measures which are properly characterised as ‘distortions’ and those which are merely 
baseline institutional conditions. The matters covered by these determinations – the basic 
structure of property regime, corporate governance, the financial system, labour law, and so 
on – are precisely those which institutional economists regard as the most significant 
institutional determinants of different varieties of market capitalism. This does not mean that 
WTO law needs to take them entirely as given, but there must be some parts of a Member’s 
legal infrastructure which in principle must be taken as given for the purposes of benchmark 
analysis. While we might disagree on precisely where to draw the line, a line simply must be 
drawn somewhere, if the international trade governance is to adhere even to a minimal 
toleration of institutional diversity. This, as I understand it, is part of Qin’s point in her 
discussion of the treatment of land use rights in US – AD/CVD just described.79 The problem 
with ‘kitchen-sink-ism’, then, is that, taken a face value, it allows no room at all for a 
category of ‘market-enabling’ or ‘market-defining’ governmental actions, and therefore in 
principle is at odds with the basic idea that governments (or their populations) have a right to 
establish the institutional parameters for markets. 
 
Importantly, this problem is not just conceptual, but practical. If any kind of state action can 
in principle ground a determination that a market is distorted, and there is no room for taking 
‘background institutional choices’ as given, then it is clear that every WTO Member is 
vulnerable. Where one country finds itself subject to trade defences on the basis that its 
markets are significantly distorted, one rational response to would be tit-for-tat retaliation – 
imposing trade defences in return on the basis of significant state ‘intervention’ in its trading 
partner. When one is determined enough, it is not difficult to create a catalogue of state 
actions in any country which affect market prices significantly – in the trivial sense that 
prices would be different were they not there. The problem with ‘kitchen-sink-ism’ is that it 
provides no conceptual tools to respond to such claims, and to explain why some state actions 
affecting prices can be considered ‘distortions’ while others cannot. It therefore provides no 
meaningful check on endless and escalating tit-for-tat retaliation.  
 
b. ‘Common-sense-ism’: inadequately justified distinctions 
 
In some cases before WTO dispute settlement, there has, in fact, been a recognition of the 
problems of ‘kitchen-sink-ism’, and an acknowledgement of the need to draw distinctions 
                                               
77 Panel Report, US – AD/CVDs, above n37, eg paras 10.111, 10.133ff, 10,144ff. See also Appellate Body 
Report, US – AD/CVDs, above n34, para 503.  
78 Panel Report, US – AD/CVDS, above n37, at para 10.79. 
79 Qin, above n52. 
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between the different kinds of governmental action set out in the previous section. Most 
recently, the Appellate Body noted: 
 
the concept of "price distortion" is not equivalent to any impact on prices as a result 
of any government intervention … the determination of whether in-country prices are 
distorted must be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the characteristics 
of the market being examined, and the nature, quantity, and quality of the information 
on the record.80 
 
This is a welcome and potentially important statement of principle. However, it is fair to say 
that, the relevant cases have so far failed to articulate a consistent – or indeed explicit – set of 
principles and premises for making this distinction. They have, apparently at least, by and 
large been based on assertions of common-sense.  
 
One example comes from the landmark subsidies case of Canada – Renewable Energy.81 As 
is well known, this case concerned a challenge to a feed-in-tariff scheme established by the 
Ontario government in an attempt to encourage a greater proportion of its population’s 
electricity needs to be supplied from renewable sources, and to eliminate the need for coal-
fired electricity plants by 2014. In order to determine whether or not payments under the 
feed-in-tariff scheme constituted subsidies, the Panel was required to compare these 
payments with a benchmark ‘market price’ for electricity. For the purposes of this paper, the 
important point is that the Panel determined that the broad energy policy goals defined by the 
Ontario government were not themselves interventions in (or distortions of) the relevant 
market, but merely one of the background conditions or parameters in which the market 
operated. It is necessary, the Panel noted, to test the FIT payments ‘against the types of arm's 
length purchase transactions that would exist in a wholesale electricity market whose broad 
parameters are defined by the Government of Ontario’.82 These ‘parameters’ included the 
elimination of coal-fired electricity plants by 2014, and the promotion of increased use of 
renewable energy as a minimum defined percentage of supply.83  
 
On appeal, the Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel for other reasons, but nevertheless 
adopted the same approach to the domestic policy environment. Like the Panel, it noted that 
the Ontario government in that case had adopted a set of general strategic goals regarding the 
electricity sector,84 and agreed that the appropriate benchmark market price should take into 
account these goals: 
 
an appropriate benefit benchmark for wind power and solar PV electricity generation 
in Ontario should be one that, within the parameters of the Government of Ontario's 
                                               
80 Appellate Body Report, US – CVDs (China), above n34, para 5.146 (citations omitted).  
81 Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector / 
Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program (Canada – Renewable Energy), WT/DS412/AB/R / 
WT/DS426/AB/R, adopted 24 May 2013; Panel Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable 
Energy Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program (Canada – Renewable 
Energy), WT/DS412/R and Add.1 / WT/DS426/R and Add.1, adopted 24 May 2013, as modified by Appellate 
Body Reports WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R. This was not, of course, strictly speaking a market 
distortion case, but it is still directly relevant to the same legal question.  
82 Panel Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy, above n81, para 7.322 (emphasis added).  
83 Ibid. 
84 Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy, above n81, esp section 4. 
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definition of the energy supply mix, reflects what a market benchmark would yield 
for wind- and solar PV-generated electricity.85 
 
Indeed, it is clear from other statement that both the Panel and the Appellate Body clearly 
understood the need to make the sorts of conceptual distinctions described in section 3 above. 
‘A distinction should be drawn’, the Appellate Body famously noted 
 
between, on the one hand, government interventions that create markets that would 
otherwise not exist and, on the other hand, other types of government interventions in 
support of certain players in markets that already exist, or to correct market 
distortions therein.86 
 
The notion of government action that ‘creates markets’ has been controversial, and is 
somewhat different from the distinctions I set out above, but can certainly be profitably 
understood as a way of articulating the idea that some governmental actions set the enabling 
conditions in which market competition takes place. The Panel, for its part, made a similar 
distinction in its decision: 
 
Governments regularly intervene in markets for a variety of reasons including in order 
to avoid outcomes that are believed to be socially unacceptable, or to address various 
market failures. For instance, governments may decide to limit the availability of 
certain products because of human health and environmental concerns, or as the 
Government of Ontario has done, choose to end the use of a particular production 
technology (coal-fired electricity generation) for the same reasons. These kinds of 
actions are designed to internalize the social costs (in the case of negative 
externalities) and benefits (in the case of positive externalities) of certain actions in 
the production and consumption decisions of economic agents. However, where such 
government intervention is limited to defining the broad parameters of a market, 
significant scope will remain for private actors to operate within those parameters on 
the basis of commercial considerations.87  
 
Where government action is of this latter kind – defining the broad parameters of a market – 
it is appropriate, according to the Panel, to take it as given for the purposes of market 
benchmarking under WTO law.88 The Appellate Body explicitly agreed.89  
 
A broadly similar set of distinctions was in play in the Panel decision in US – AD/CVDs.90 
Recall that in that case, one of the claims concerned the the provision of finance at allegedly 
below-market rates by Chinese state-owned banks to certain producers of a range of products 
including steel pipes, other metal pipes and tubes, woven sacks and tyres. Again, in order to 
determine whether these financing arrangements constituted subsidies, it was necessary to 
compare them to benchmark market rates for equivalent financing. In this context, the US 
investigating authority had determined that domestic Chinese interest rates were too distorted 
to provide an adequate basis for a market benchmark, and instead used an alternative 
benchmark based on a constructed proxy. This determination rested on a range of actions of 
                                               
85 Id., para 5.227. 
86 id., para 5.188.  
87 Panel Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy, above n81, n633 to para 7.322, emphasis added.  
88 Ibid.  
89 Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy, above n81, para 5.189 and n686. 
90 Panel Report, US – AD/CVDs, above n37. 
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the Chinese government in relation to the financial sector.91 Before the Panel, China argued 
that all financial markets are, necessarily and inherently, shaped by state action and state 
policies, if only through the setting of benchmark interest rates by central banks.92 For China, 
all interest rates are therefore ‘distorted’, and there was no basis to discard domestic interest 
rates in China as the proper benchmark. In response, the Panel asserted that there is a ‘clear 
distinction’, 
 
between, on the one hand, the government as the setter and implementer of the 
general monetary policy of a country; and, on the other hand, the government 
participating as a lender and/or otherwise intervening in the lending market as such, in 
a way and to an extent that effectively it is the government, and not the market, that 
establishes the lending rates.93 
 
The ‘simple implementation of monetary policy’, the Panel suggested, ‘by definition cannot 
give rise to distortion’, and must simply be taken as given for the purposes of defining a 
benchmark interest rate. On the other hand, China’s interventions could not be ‘accepted “as 
is” as the underlying “market” condition’.94 This, it seems, was because they were of a 
different ‘kind and degree’,95 but the Panel offered no more detailed basis for the distinction, 
treating it instead as largely self-evident in this case. 
 
The point of drawing attention to these passages is not to agree or disagree substantively with 
the choices made by the adjudicators in them. It is easy to think of many justifications, and 
indeed many criticisms, of both of them. As it happens, the distinctions drawn in Canada – 
Renewable Energy proved to be controversial amongst close observers of WTO 
jurisprudence, while the Panel’s decision on this point in US – AD/CVDs did not.96 The point 
is simply to note that, as the jurisprudence on market distortions continues to develop, it is 
inevitable that distinctions such as these will have to be made, and that adjudicators will be 
forced to articulate and defend the unstated premises on which they are based. It is 
inadequate to treat them as self-evident or a matter of common-sense. In the absence of a 
more explicit considered approach, it will be hard to avoid the suspicion that investigating 
authorities will often find markets to be distorted, ‘merely because they do not accord with an 
investigating authority's conception of how markets should be structured and regulated’.97 
And it will be equally difficult for panels to articulate an adequate basis for identifying the 
circumstances in which they impermissibly do so. 
 
c. The improper use of world market prices 
 
                                               
91 Id., paras 10.111, 10.133ff, 10,144ff.  
92 Id., para 10.124, see also para 10.90. 
93 Id., para 10.126. 
94 Id., para 10.125 and surrounding.  
95 Id, para 10.125. 
96 See, eg, Cosbey and Mavroidis, ‘A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial Policy and Renewable 
Energy: The Case for Redrafting the Subsidies Agreement of the WTO’, Journal of International Economic 
Law 11-47 (2014); Pal, ‘Has the Appellate Body’s Decision in Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-In 
Tariff Program Opened the Door for Production Subsidies’, Journal of International Economic Law 125-137 
(2014); Charnovitz and Fischer, ‘Canada – Renewable Energy: implications for WTO law on green and not-so-
green subsidies’, EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2014/109 (2014); Rubini, ‘The Good, The Bad and the Ugly: 
Lessons on Methodology in Legal Analysis from the Recent WTO Litigation on Renewable Energy Subsidies’, 
48(5) Journal of World Trade 895-938 (2014).  
97 Panel Report, US – AD/CVDs, above n37, para 10.69. 
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The third confusion concerns the use which has at times been made of world market prices. 
In some circumstances, the determination that domestic prices are distorted is made on the 
basis of a significant difference between international and domestic prices. One example 
comes from Biodiesel cases, in which the EU’s antidumping authority purported to reject the 
actual input costs (of soybeans) for producers of biodiesel from Indonesia and Argentina, on 
the basis that such costs were distorted by export bans placed on domestically produced 
soybeans.98 This practice was famously rejected in those cases – but here I am interested in 
the underlying reasoning, which was not rejected, that the difference in domestic and 
international prices of soybeans demonstrated both the existence and the magnitude of a price 
‘distortion’ in domestic soybean markets in Indonesia and Argentina.  
 
It is one thing to observe that the export bans in place in Indonesia and Argentina affect 
domestic prices – this seems relatively uncontroversial on the facts of the case. But it is quite 
another to characterise this effect as indicating a ‘distortion’ of domestic prices. This is a 
much trickier and more complicated question that it initially appears. It is crucial to 
remember that world prices are themselves the product in part of a set of institutional 
conditions which govern the conditions of competition between participants in world 
markets. These institutional conditions include not only domestic laws (of all major producer 
and consumer countries) with cross-border effects, but also international rules governing the 
relations between them. Once one accepts the specificity and contingency of these 
institutional arrangements – that is to say, once one accepts that they represent only one way 
of organising world markets, rather than an ideal free market – then it becomes clear that 
there is no reason to think that a deviation between domestic and international prices 
necessarily and entirely derives from distortions on the domestic side. Moreover, it becomes 
clear that international prices might not be an appropriate comparator at all. Recall that for 
the purposes of WTO trade remedies law, in making a determination that a market is 
relevantly distorted, we are not comparing it to an imagined ‘perfectly competitive’ market in 
the abstract, but to an undistorted market with the basic structure and characteristics of the 
domestic market in question. The real question, then, is whether international prices represent 
a good approximation of what prices would be in that undistorted domestic market.  
 
The answer to this question in turn depends in part on whether or not we take the degree of 
international openness of that market as given for the purposes of the analysis. If we do, and 
if the market is relatively closed, then there is very little reason to place much significance on 
the existence of a differential between international and domestic prices. In the absence of 
international competitive pressure, there is simply no reason to assume that world prices need 
necessarily bear any resemblance to the prices which would be produced by an undistorted 
domestic market with its own quite distinct institutional conditions. If we do not – that is to 
say, if our reference point is a domestic market with the same institutional characteristics, but 
fully open to international competition – then the existence of a difference may well be 
relevant. But it is not at all clear which approach is the right one to take to this issue. Which 
of a country’s myriad trade barriers ought to be taken as part of the given institutional 
conditions of its domestic market for the purposes of a distortion analysis, and which should 
not? Given that no market anywhere is truly characterised by a complete absence of barriers, 
and given indeed that world market prices reflect in part the prevalence of such barriers, what 
degree of international openness should be assumed as part of a distortion analysis? A simple 
                                               
98 Appellate Body Report, EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), above n46; Panel Report, European Union – Anti-
Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Indonesia, WT/DS480/R and Add.1, adopted 28 February 2018. The use 
of evidence of lack of import penetration in domestic markets for coking coal, caustic soda and kaolin clay in 
US – CVD (China), above n34, is based on similar reasoning. 
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comparison of domestic and world prices does not permit us to approach this question in a 
coherent manner.  
 
d. Proxy choices and re-adjustment 
 
The fourth and final problem has to do with a later stage of the analysis, after a domestic 
market has been found to be relevantly distorted. Recall that where domestic markets are 
found to be relevantly distorted, then investigating authorities may take into account world 
market prices, prices in foreign markets, prices constructed from data on the production costs 
of domestic producers, or indeed other sources of data, in constructing an appropriate 
benchmark.99 The current confusion about the notion of distortion has left this area of 
practice in a poor state.  
 
One issue is that the choice of third country markets rarely takes into account the institutional 
similarities and dissimilarities between that third country and the domestic market in 
question. Factors such as market size, level of development, and geographic region are 
sometimes taken into account, but rarely institutional conditions. One attempt to do so simply 
sought to control for institutional ‘quality’ based on international indicators of political 
stability, government effectiveness, and the rule of law.100 Probably the only exception – and 
in some respects the exemplar here – is the benchmark analysis in the Canada – Renewable 
Energy case, in which proposed benchmarks from electricity markets in other Canadian 
provinces, as well as some US states, were explicitly rejected as appropriate comparators on 
the basis of the very different institutional choices which had been made in establishing those 
markets.101  
 
In principle, a poor choice of third country market might be corrected by an appropriate 
adjustment. Recall that, whenever out-of-country data are used, the investigating authority is 
‘under an obligation to ensure that the resulting benchmark relates or refers to, or is 
connected with, prevailing market conditions in the country of provision’.102 Put another way, 
the investigating authority must ‘do its best to identify a benchmark that approximates the 
[domestic] market conditions that would prevail in the absence of the distortion’.103 Out of 
country prices are only to be used as far as they can help to generate an ‘estimate of’ (or 
‘proxy for’104) the ultimate benchmark, which is the domestic market of the subsidising 
Member – as it would be, absent the distorting interventions of that Member. As a result, 
adjustments should be made to prices deriving from world markets or foreign markets so as 
to replicate as far as possible the prevailing market conditions in the domestic market of the 
exporting member.105 This should include identifying those background institutional 
conditions of the domestic market which should be taken as given for the purposes of 
benchmark analysis, and adjusting the constructed benchmark so that it reflects the prices 
which would be established in a market with such institutional conditions. 
 
                                               
99 Eg, Appellate Body Report, US – Lumber IV, above n31, at paras 105-106. 
100 Panel Report, US – AD/CVDs, above n37, para 10.193. 
101 Panel Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy, above n81, esp. paras 7.303ff.  
102 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, above n31, paras 89, 96, 106; Appellate Body Report, US 
– Carbon Steel (India), above n34, para 4.158.  
103 Panel Report, US - AD/CVDs (China), above n37, para 10.187. 
104 Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, above n31, para 7.57. 
105 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, above n31 para 108; Appellate Body Report, US - 
Carbon Steel (India), above n34, para 4.158. 
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This simply does not happen at present in any rigorous way.106 In some cases, domestic 
investigating authorities simply use out-of-country benchmarks without any significant 
adjustment. In at least one instance, this was considered acceptable by a WTO panel with 
little explanation.107 In other cases the process of adjustment is give only cursory attention.108 
This can at times have bizarre results. Recall, for example, that in US – AD/CVDs, US 
investigating authorities in the investigations in question had used data on the price for land 
use rights in certain regions of Thailand as proxies for the market value of Chinese land use 
rights. In response, China argued that USDOC had not even attempted to account for a range 
of factors which might legitimately lead to differences in the value of land use rights between 
China and Thailand: tax treatment of land purchases; the quality of local schooling, hospitals 
and transport infrastructure, as well as rules concerning their availability and cost; zoning and 
planning laws; prevailing interest rates and regulatory rules governing the provision of credit 
for land acquisitions; and so on.109 Whatever one thinks of the means of distributing land use 
rights in China, the underlying logic of China’s complaint here seems reasonable. It is heroic 
to imagine that land prices in Thai even approximately reflect prevailing domestic Chinese 
conditions, when China’s choices on all of these matters are properly taken into account. But 
the Panel was not convinced:  
 
while there can be no question that the Thai land prices and constructed annual rents 
relied upon by the USDOC do not provide a perfect picture of what prices for land-
use rights would be in China in the absence of the distortions that the USDOC found 
to exist, it nevertheless is not clear that the fact of adjusting those benchmarks, as 
such, would ensure a closer approximation of the counterfactual situation (an 
undistorted land use rights market in China). 110  
 
In any case, the Panel continued, ‘China has not demonstrated that the USDOC failed to 
make any specific adjustment which it was required to make or which the Government of 
China or interested parties had identified, before the USDOC or before us’.111  
 
Other examples could easily be given.112 The problem here is not just that the alternative 
benchmarks used are unrealistic – though that is certainly a real issue. In practice, the use of 
unadjusted foreign prices can fundamentally transform the market benchmark test from an 
internal to an external yardstick, judging a state’s actions against norms of market conduct 
derived from markets which reflect political and institutional choices which are not that 
country’s own. Qin has argued persuasively that permitting the use of unadjusted foreign 
prices as benchmarks in this way is seriously problematic, because it can negate the 
comparative advantage of the exporting state, and because it fails to take account of the 
sovereign right of that state to design its market institutions (for her, the focus of attention is 
on the domestic regime of property ownership) as it sees fit.113 The latter point seems exactly 
right. A failure adequately to adjust foreign market prices to reflect ‘prevailing market 
                                               
106 See also Qin, above n52, eg text accompanying nn66-67. 
107 Panel Report, US – Carbon Steel (India), above n34 in respect of the use of Australian prices for coal, at para 
7.264; Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel (India), above n34, para 4.322.  
108 In both Panel Report, US – Coated Paper (Indonesia), above n34, and Panel Report and Appellate Body 
Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, above n31, the question of adjustment was not considered, since the 
complainants’ arguments were for one reason or another focussed elsewhere. 
109 Panel Report, US – AD/CVDs (China), above n37, para 10.189.  
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid.  
112 The literature cited in n49 above gives many examples from domestic US jurisprudence.  
113 Qin, above n52. 
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conditions’ in the exporting state runs directly counter to the idea that states and their 






Faced with these and other difficulties, a number of the most thoughtful observers of 
international trade law have suggested discarding the market distortion test altogether, and 
starting over.114 One can easily understand why: conceptually, the problems with the concept 
of ‘market distortion’ are frankly insoluble, at least at the level of principle. On this view, one 
way of proceeding would simply be to prohibit the use of trade remedies altogether. This is 
periodically proposed in the literature, and is clearly the favoured approach of some scholars, 
but it is of course at present not politically feasibly – nor would it be desirable in the absence 
of a replacement ‘buffer’ mechanism. A more easily imagined way ahead would simply be to 
pursue transactional solutions to the problem. On this approach, the general rules would 
simply prohibit the differential treatment of distorted and non-distorted markets in the 
application of trade defences – but this would be coupled with a parallel process by which 
states may contract out of these rules on an agreed basis. This may, most obviously, take the 
form of bilateral or plurilateral agreements by which one state agrees to be treated differently 
in the context of the application of trade defences, in return (presumably) for other 
concessions of one kind or another. It is essentially the model of China’s Accession Protocol, 
but applied on a bilateral, and perhaps permanent, basis. Despite a range of legal difficulties 
associated with this approach, it may be that we are headed in this direction, at least in the 
context of US-China relations. 
 
Close observers of the GATT/WTO system will know that ad hoc or exceptional 
arrangements of this kind have at least informally played an important role in the system in 
the past, particularly during periods of stress. They can act as safety valves of sort – practical 
mechanisms for resolving tensions which might otherwise threaten the system as a whole – 
and there is no question that they have successfully performed that function in the past. To 
the extent that they make the pursuit of fairness costly, they may in fact be preferable in some 
ways to a system of apparently general rules which is not general in practice: that is to say, a 
system which permits the costless denial of some of the practical benefits of membership to 
some Members on the grounds of their legitimate institutional choices. But of course such 
mechanisms also come with considerable costs and risks. The most obvious risks relate to the 
general threat such arrangements pose to the idea of a multilateral rules-based order – the 
idea of a single system of rules, applicable to all WTO Members equally, which governs 
trading relations on a non-discriminatory basis. But there is another risk which is just as 
important, and perhaps less visible. I noted above that preserving a generalised capacity for 
institutional experimentation of an open-ended kind is an important systemic good for the 
global trading order. To the extent that the frictions caused by institutional diversity are 
resolved through bilateral means, there is a distinct possibility that this global systemic 
interest is lost – or at least given inadequate weight – in the specific bargains struck between 
pairs of trading nations. The risk, then, would be the incremental creation of an order which 
did not preserve that systemic capacity as far as it should. 
 
                                               
114 See eg, Tarullo, above n25; Sykes, above n52.  
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The remainder of this section, then, asks what a legal solution to the problem might be, and in 
particular whether the notion of ‘market distortion’ can be made legally operable despite its 
conceptual flaws. But it is important to be clear at the start about what we can reasonably 
expect a legal ‘solution’ of this sort to look like. The problem of institutional diversity is 
fundamentally a meta-institutional problem. That is to say, it is not a question of the right 
rules to define fair and unfair competition in a single global market order, but of the right 
rules to govern competition between differently-instituted market orders, each organized 
around their own conceptions of fair and unfair competition. It would, at least in present 
circumstances,115 be naïve to imagine that a single, shared conception of what constitutes 
‘fair’ competition is achievable amongst the diverse WTO membership. The task is, 
therefore, neither to produce such a shared conception, nor to reduce an existing shared 
conception into legal rules. Furthermore, it would be equally naïve to imagine that a solution 
can be found simply by finding the crafting the right rules and interpreting them in the right 
way. There is simply no single set of logical or normative principles by which we can give 
definite content to the notion of ‘market distortion’ without trespassing upon deeply sensitive 
and contested questions, and we should not imagine that our job is to find such principles. 
That is just not what a ‘solution’ to this sort of problem looks like. 
 
Instead, what the history of the GATT/WTO system reveals is that the frictions caused by 
intra-capitalist diversity have in the past been addressed – provisionally, incompletely, but 
adequately – through a series of messy compromises, expressed in legal rules and concepts 
which are just ‘good enough’ to help hold together a multilateral system which its members 
perceive to be on balance in their own long term interests. The question for this section is 
whether the concept of ‘market distortion’ – understood as a practical legal tool 
operationalized in the specific context of the adjudication of international trade disputes – can 
be made to perform that modest but important task. It seems to me that the answer to this 
question might be yes, but with the crucially important qualification that this will only be so 
if it is interpreted and applied on the basis of a fully dereified understanding of the 
institutionally embedded character of markets. Without this, it is likely to do more harm than 
good, and to exacerbate the problems to which it is offered as a solution. 
 
We can learn a lot about how to approach the challenge of institutional diversity by looking 
at the way the WTO dispute settlement system approached the problem of regulatory 
diversity in its first decades. The bedrock principle of this approach has been that states have 
the right to set their own regulatory objectives and determine the level of protection they seek 
in respect of regulatory risks. At every stage, the dispute settlement system has refused to 
draw bright lines defining the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate regulation, or to 
given substantive content to any particular understanding of ‘right’ or ‘optimal’ regulation.116 
At the same time, it has, incrementally, and somewhat experimentally, developed a body of 
open-ended tests and forms of review – such as anti-arbitrariness norms, proportionality 
review, procedural review, basic tests of good faith and so on – which provide practical 
assistance in the resolution of regulatory frictions, without trespassing on those bedrock 
principles. While no-one to my knowledge would suggest that WTO adjudicators have 
always got it right, this messy mix of legal tools and techniques has so far done a ‘good 
enough’ job of addressing regulatory disputes in a sensitive and practical manner.  
 
                                               
115 Note, however, that Alford, above n49, suggests precisely this. It may well have been a more realistic 
proposal at the time he was writing.  
116 For a perceptive account, see Howse, ‘The World Trade Organisation 20 years on: Global Governance by 
Judiciary’, 27(1) European Journal of International Law 9-77 (2016). 
33 
 
It seems to me that adopting a similar approach would be profitable in response to the 
challenge of institutional diversity. The core features of this approach are easy to describe. In 
this context, the bedrock principle would be that WTO Members can legitimately establish 
the institutional conditions for their own markets. This principle is already part of the system: 
as noted above, it is visible throughout the history of the GATT/WTO, and is expressed in the 
deep structure of WTO law, especially the law relating to trade defences.117 As a 
consequence, a clear legal distinction would be drawn between a market ‘distortion’ and a 
governmental measure which formed part of the background institutional conditions of that 
Member’s market. Where a measure is properly characterised as a background institutional 
condition, it would not be permissible for an investigating authority to use it as evidence of 
price distortion. In addition, where surrogate prices are used as benchmark for other reasons, 
this alternative benchmark must be adjusted, as far as reasonable and possible, to ensure that 
it reflects a market with such background institutional conditions. 
 
Similar to the regulatory context, it would be crucial that the WTO dispute settlement system 
avoid drawing bright lines around the notion of ‘market distortion’, lest it be seen to be 
defining the ‘right’ or ‘proper’ institutional arrangements for competitive markets, or filling 
in substantive notion of ‘fairness’ on which the membership has not (and probably cannot) 
agree. It is important in this respect to recall that, at least in the context of the application of 
trade defences, it will of course be the importing state’s investigating authority which makes 
the determination that a foreign market, or foreign price, is ‘distorted’. It will therefore be the 
for the investigating authority to characterise a foreign government’s measure as either 
‘distortive’ or a ‘background institution’ in the first instance. The role for the WTO 
adjudicative bodies would merely be to review that assessment. In a recent statement of the 
standard of review applicable to WTO review of investigating authorities’ decision, the AB 
noted: 
 
it is the role of panels to assess whether the investigating authority's explanation for 
its determination is reasoned and adequate by critically reviewing that explanation, in 
depth, and in light of the facts and explanations presented by the interested parties.118 
 
In the specific context of a distortion analysis, it noted, ‘panels have to review whether the 
competent authority's explanation of how government intervention actually results in price 
distortion in the markets in question fully addresses the nature and complexities of the data in 
the record, and whether it appears adequate in light of alternative methods, data, and 
explanations of that data presented by the parties’.119 Under the Antidumping Agreement, it is 
worth recalling, a separate standard of review is defined in Article 17.6. For factual matters, 
the panel’s task is to ‘determine whether the authorities’ establishment of the facts was 
proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective’.120 
Accordingly, where an investigating authority determines that a foreign market is so distorted 
                                               
117 The key point here is that both ‘benefit’ and ‘normal value’ refer to prices in the domestic market of 
exporting/subsidizing Member. Thus, as noted above, the essential character of the market benchmark test is a 
form of internal review – that is to say, a form of review which assesses state action (here, the grant of a 
subsidy) or private action (here, dumping) against its own internal norms of conduct (here, norms of market 
behaviour derived from its own domestic markets, operating within the conditions set by the host state itself). 
118 Appellate Body Report, US – CVDs (China( (21.5), above n34, para 5.155, citing Appellate Body Report, 
United States – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and 
Australia, WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2001, para 106. See also para 7.205 in the 
Panel Report in the same dispute. 
119 Appellate Body Report, US – CVDs (China) (21.5), above n34, para 5.155, see also paras 5.164, 5.177. 
120 Antidumping Agreement, Art 17.6(i).  
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that in-country prices are unsuitable as benchmarks, the role of the panel is not to assess 
whether that determination is ‘correct’ according to some universal standard of ‘distortion’, 
but rather to assess whether the determination is adequate according to the above standard of 
review. 
 
This does not mean that the substantive content of the notion of ‘market distortion’ is entirely 
for each investigating authority to determine for itself according to its own values and 
standards of fairness. It would be perfectly permissible – and entirely in keeping with the 
approach WTO jurisprudence has taken in the regulatory context – for international tribunals 
to develop a non-exhaustive list of indicative factors to be taken into account in such 
determinations. These would no doubt include, for example: the generality of the measure in 
question; the objective intention (if any) behind its enactment; the historical and political 
conditions of its emergence; its systemic functional importance in the economy in question 
and its interaction with other structural elements of that economy; and so on. But it does 
mean that the process of WTO review could, and probably often would, focus on matters 
other than the substantive correctness of the investigating authority’s characterisation. For 
example, indications of partiality – perhaps where such determinations are made 
inconsistently as between different trading partners, or in an obviously discriminatory manner 
– may be of particular significance. So too may procedural matters: an assessment may be 
made, for example, of the adequacy of the opportunities give to a foreign producer to 
challenge the finding of distortion, and of the seriousness and justifiability of the responses 
given by the investigating authority to such challenges. Where a Member without 
justification applies a different standard to its own market as compared to that of a foreign 
market, this may also in some circumstances be an indication of a failure to meet a standard 
of objectivity, impartiality and coherence. Similarly, WTO dispute settlement may be 
particularly concerned to ensure that investigating authorities’ decisions in this regard are 
scrupulously informed and outward-looking: based as far as possible on an informed and 
careful understanding of the institutional foundations of foreign markets, rather than an 
unthinking and parochial projection of ‘normal’ market relations based on their own home 
context. Those familiar with WTO jurisprudence will recognise almost all of these moves 
immediately: they have been an important part of the approach adopted by the Appellate 
Body, for example, in the context of the adjudication of scientific disagreements in the 
context of the application of the SPS Agreement,121 as well as its regulatory jurisprudence 
more generally. They are part of the standard toolset which WTO adjudicators have crafted 
over time to help them review sensitive and contested questions: simultaneously permitting 
the possibility of meaningful oversight where appropriate, while avoiding impossibly 
contentious or practically undecidable issues where necessary.  
 
This approach may also go some way towards ameliorating, in practice, the problems 
associated with the process of adjustment. I suggested above that a core aspect of the 
proposed approach would be for investigating authorities to be required rigorously to adjust 
surrogate prices, wherever they were used, so that the constructed benchmark reflects prices 
which would exist in a market with any measure it determines to constitute a ‘background 
institutional condition’ in the exporting foreign market. This is, as noted, essentially what is 
already required under both the Antidumping Agreement and the Subsidies Agreement, even 
if it does not seem to be particularly rigorously applied in practice at present. The biggest 
                                               
121 See, eg, Schropp, ‘Commentary on the Appellate Body Report in Australia-Apples (DS367): judicial review 
in the face of uncertainty’, 11 World Trade Review 171-221 (2012); Lang, ‘New Legal Realism, empiricism, 




difficulty with its application, of course, is likely to be its practicality. This is in part because 
the full range of domestic institutional conditions which in principle ought to be taken into 
account is potentially extremely wide. In principle, it could include any underlying conditions 
affecting levels of supply and demand in domestic markets as compared to unadjusted out-of-
country comparison.122 They may be social (differences in consumer preferences); 
demographic (the size and structure of the population making up the market); geographic 
(having to do with market accessibility); economic (the number, size and nature of market 
participants, and the degree of competition between them); and indeed much else besides. 
Importantly, for the purposes of this argument, they can also be political and legal – that is to 
say, they include at least some aspects of the domestic legal, regulatory, institutional and 
policy environment which establish the general conditions in which market activity takes 
place, as long as they can be shown to lead to identifiable and reasonably predictable price 
differentials between foreign and domestic markets. With such a huge multiplicity of 
institutional arrangements which could in principle be relevant, it is clear that the process of 
adjustment could very quickly become unwieldy and unreliable, and certainly not amenable 
to precise economic modelling.123 This is especially the case where the distortion is alleged to 
derive from the complex interaction of different institutional elements. 
 
Again, however, the problem appears more tractable when the standard of review is properly 
considered. It is for the investigating authority in the first instance to identify the range of 
institutional aspects which demand adjustment, and to carry out the adjustment in accordance 
with a methodology of its own choosing. It is for the WTO dispute settlement system to 
review those actions in accordance with the standard of review set out earlier. Applying this 
standard of review, it is unlikely that a WTO Panel would require the investigating authority 
to take into account all conceivable institutional conditions – it would be perfectly 
permissible to determine whether the subset of institutional conditions actually considered 
was reasonable and defensible in all the circumstances, taking into account the available 
information, the arguments of the parties, and other practical constraints. Similarly, a Panel 
would not be seeking to determine whether the adjustment methodology used produced the 
right result, but rather whether it represented a ‘reasoned and adequate’ approach to the 
problem. There is, to be sure, a level of imprecision, uncertainty and disagreement which 
inevitably would have to be tolerated. At the same time, it is not too burdensome to ask that 
this process of adjustment be evidence-based, coherent, and properly reasoned. It should not 
be acceptable for an investigating authority simply to declare that adjustment is too complex, 
and therefore to refuse even to attempt it.124 And it is perfectly practical to require 
investigating authorities to make every effort to take the institutional choices of foreign states 
into account in their analysis of market distortions, and to respond adequately and fully to 
arguments made in domestic proceedings that they have not properly done so. This is the 
approach taken in the context of review of scientific risk assessments under the SPS 
agreement – assessments which can be at least as complex, uncertain, and subject to 
evidentiary problems, as the process of benchmark adjustment. It has worked reasonably well 
there.  
 
                                               
122 Note the very general wording of Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel (India), above n34, para 4.245, 
also para 4.243: ‘We recall that the term "prevailing market conditions" in Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement 
describes the generally accepted characteristics of an area of economic activity in which the forces of supply 
and demand interact to determine market prices’. 
123 Cf Qin, above n52. An example from the jurisprudence can be found in Panel Report, US – AD/CVDs, above 
n37, para 10.189. 
124 See Panel Report, US – AD/CVDs, above n37, at n622. 
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Of course, an approach of this kind will have both advantages and disadvantages. Its great 
strength is its flexibility – that is to say, the ability it gives to judicial bodies to craft a basis 
for decision which is responsive to the peculiar context in which it is applied, including its 
political and economic sensitivities. It is an approach which is appropriate for those situations 
in which a rigid and unbending standard is unworkable. At the same time, these strengths are 
also weaknesses. An approach such as that outlined here relies heavily for its acceptability 
and practical functionality on the adjudicators who apply it – their sensitivity to institutional 
context, the limits of their own mandates, the ability to understand and respond practically to 
the specificities of the challenge before them. As such, it is an approach which is most 
suitable in a dispute resolution system which is characterised by a high degree of trust in, and 
deference to, such judicial decision-makers. At least the latter condition (and possibly both) 
appears less certain in relation to the WTO than it once used to, and its adoption may place 
great weight on the institution’s credibility at time when it is under the greatest strain. 
 
That said, it seems to me that this approach – with all its flaws, messiness and ambiguity – is 
hugely preferable to an alternative which appears to be emerging in the jurisprudence. Given 
the indeterminacy and malleability of the concept of ‘market distortion’, a clear danger of its 
incorporation into WTO trade remedies jurisprudence is that it opens the door to the 
proliferation of (protectionist) trade defences, without a clear means of controlling them. One 
clear response to this concern has been to attempt to limit the applicability of the ‘distortions’ 
jurisprudence to a very narrow set of circumstances. Recall that, in the earliest stages of this 
jurisprudence, the Appellate Body confined itself to formulating a very limited principle, 
which apparently limited resot to out-of-country benchmarks only where: the government is 
the only supplier of the particular goods in question; the government administratively 
controls all the prices for those goods in the country; or domestic private prices are distorted 
because of the predominant role of the government in the market as a provider of the same or 
similar goods.125 It also made clear that this principle should be cautiously and rarely 
applied.126 More recently, as the door has opened to arguments based on the existence of 
distortions of an unspecified but clearly broader kind than those originally contemplated, a 
different way of narrowing the application of the distorted markets methodology has been 
emphasised. This to limit its use to only those cases in which the distortions are of a 
sufficient magnitude or significance, or of a particularly serious or widespread character. As 
noted above, the EU has adopted the same approach in its new antidumping regulation with 
its concept of a ‘significant’ market distortion.127 Furthermore, the Appellate Body has 
already indicated that this is likely to be part of its preferred approach, noting that ‘the market 
from which a benchmark is selected for the purpose of a benefit analysis need not be 
completely undistorted or free [from] any government intervention.’128  
 
The aspirations behind this approach are clear. By limiting its application to apparently 
‘extreme’ cases of particular obvious or widespread intervention, one hope is no doubt that it 
will garner more support. Where the anticipated targets are few in number and predictable, it 
may be thought that fewer countries will fear the consequences for their own exports, and 
that the systemic impact of trade defences triggered by ‘distortions’ will be kept within 
reasonable bounds. It may also be thought that limiting its application to only very clear or 
                                               
125 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, above n31, para 98, 103. Though this is not a per se rule, 
see the same report at para 102, also Appellate Body Report, US – AD/CVDs (China), above n34, para 445 and 
surrounding.  
126 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, above n31, para 102. 
127 Text accompanying n75 above.  
128 Appellate Body Report, US – CVDs (China) (21.5), above n34, paras 7.50-7.51.  
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substantial examples of serious distortion will limit the need to engage with the hard, 
borderline cases, and thereby reduce the risk of being drawn into the thankless task of 
defining the notion of market distortion in a rigorous or precise way.  
 
However, it seems to me the reality is likely to be quite different. On one hand, if the out-of-
country methodology were limited to cases involving the circularity problem, it would have 
very limited utility in resolving the broader tensions between institutional variants of 
capitalism. On the other hand, limiting its application to only very significant distortions risks 
being counterproductive, and is unlikely to lead to the benefits imagined. There are two 
possible trajectories, each with its own associated problem. It may be that adopting this 
approach would lead in fact to the use of a substantially different trade defence regime for 
probably only a small handful of countries – similar to the existing NME regime, but based 
on different and less secure foundations. This would risk reinforcing the sense that, in 
practice, the concept of ‘distorted markets’ is a tool for disciplining only radically new and 
different or unfamiliar market forms, or for neutralising the competitive threat from 
geopolitical rivals. This would legitimately give rise to the complaint that it serves primarily 
to justify differential treatment of a relatively small set of countries, whose primary shared 
characteristic is their institutional distance from a perceived understanding of normal market 
relations. Alternatively, limiting the application of the principle to ‘significant’ distortions 
may do little to limit the tit-fot-tat retaliation which I have argued above is likely to occur in 
response to the application of the market distortion test. If this were the case, it would 
become clear that this approach does not, in truth, avoid the problem of having to define the 
nature and boundaries of the concept of ‘distortion’. This is a conceptual problem that is 
almost certain to arise one way or another, whether or not it is qualified by the language of 
‘significance’.  
 
One final point is worth mentioning. An added benefit of the approach outlined above is that 
in a (limited) subset of cases, it can come close to the application of something approaching a 
proportionality test, which has been tried and tested in other areas of WTO jurisprudence. 
The clearest illustration of this comes from the Appellate Body’s reasoning in Canada – 
Renewable Energy. As noted above, the Appellate Body suggested that the appropriate 
benchmark to establish whether the feed-in-tariffs constituted subsidies should take into 
account the broader strategic goals of the Ontario government. Accordingly, to repeat the 
passage cited earlier: 
 
an appropriate benefit benchmark for windpower and solar PV electricity generation 
in Ontario should be one that, within the parameters of the Government of Ontario's 
definition of the energy supply mix, reflects what a market benchmark would yield 
for wind- and solar PV-generated electricity.129 
 
The appropriate benchmark, that is to say, is the price produced by a market in which 
renewable energy constitutes the proportion of supply as defined in the Ontario government’s 
strategic goals. Put another way, the question of whether or not a subsidy existed was 
equivalent to the question whether the Ontario government set prices for renewable energy 
higher than was strictly necessary in order to achieve their preferred energy supply mix. Note 
that while this approach did take Ontario’s strategic goals as a given part of the prevailing 
market conditions, this was not equivalent to simply accepting the subsidy measures 
themselves as part of those conditions – in fact, the Appellate Body itself hinted at a number 
                                               
129 Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy, above n81, para 5.227. 
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of points that the Ontario government may in fact have set prices excessively high, even 
taking into account its legitimate policy goals.130 
 
In the language of this paper, the determination in this case was that fundamental policy 
context of Ontario’s electricity market – that is to say, the Ontario government’s supply mix 
goals – was treated as a ‘background institutional condition’ for that market, and was 
therefore required to be reflected in the market benchmark used for comparison.  
Conceptually, this has much to commend it: any other possibility is both nonsensical 
(because there is no reason to think that the government would give up on those objectives 
even in the absence of the specific measure in question) and incorrect (because nothing in the 
WTO agreements ought to constrain outright the pursuit of such objectives, provided that 
they are legitimate, and genuinely public). As a consequence, the relevant benchmark 
analysis effectively tested whether the support program had raised prices higher than was 
strictly required to meet public policy objectives for the sector. In this way, institutionally 
sensitive market-benchmarking was applied in a way which approached the means-end tests 
associated with proportionality review.131 This is far more comfortable ground for an 
adjudicative body than being asked to delineate precisely the boundaries of such a fraught 
and contested concept as ‘market distortion’. Pragmatically, it brings the jurisprudence on 
market distortions closer in its substance to the substantial body of jurisprudence on trade-
restrictive regulatory measures for legitimate public policies – a smart move, given that this 
latter jurisprudence is more evolved, and more generally accepted, than the former.  
 
That said, I do not wish to over-emphasise this point. For one thing, it will very often be the 
case that the relevant institutional conditions of the domestic market do not take the form of 
overt, legitimate public policy goals as they did in the Canada – Renewable Energy case. 
Most of the core institutional conditions – labour market arrangements, regimes of property 
rights, mechanisms for allocating finance, corporate governance system, and so on – cannot 
realistically be treated as embodying discrete and identifiable public policy goals, and as a 
result are simply not amenable to the application of this sort of means-end proportionality 
test. For another thing, this approach will only be practical where it does not lead to the 
circularity problem. That is to say, it is likely to provide an acceptable solution only where a 
meaningful distinction can be drawn between the precise public policy measure which is 
being challenged (the effect of which must be tested), and the broader public policy goals 
which that measure expresses (which ought to be taken as given, and controlled for). This 





I have argued in this paper that the contemporary trade frictions should be understood, in 
part, as being driven by radical changes in the institutional foundations of global capitalism 
since the 1990s. In particular, they reflect the emergence since that time of a wide range of 
new ‘varieties of capitalism’, of which China’s hybrid market economy is only one. The 
                                               
130 Id., eg, para 5.241. 
131 A commentator on a draft of this paper has asked whether this approach is applicable in the anti-dumping 
context. Certainly, it is more readily applicable in the context of a benefit analysis in the subsidies context, but it 
seems to me it is also in principle possible also to apply in respect of antidumping. The point would not be to 
assess the proportionality of private pricing – this makes no sense – but rather to assess whether any particular 
measure, or suite of measures, constitutes a ‘distortion’, as part of the application of an alternative methodology 
in the determination of normal value.  
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emergence of these new market forms, and their deeper integration, is a sign of the strength 
of the system, but it is also a source of very serious friction. Such frictions have emerged 
before, and the GATT/WTO system has evolved a series of practical techniques – expressed 
and embedded in its legal framework – for addressing them, in a more or less effective 
manner. The expiration of section 15(a)(ii) of China’s Accession Protocol, coupled with a 
range of other long-simmering concerns, have placed this existing legal and institutional 
framework under pressure. This has in turn given rise to the emergence of new legal 
techniques to manage this pressure, one of the most important of which is the concept of 
‘market distortion’ which has emerged, quite explicitly, as a response to a perceived Chinese 
threat. We have already proceeded some distance down the road of embedding this concept 
as a central feature of international trade governance, but in my view we have done so with 
an inadequate appreciation of the difficulties it will necessarily lead us into. The concept can 
be a useful one, but it brings with it certain risks. The potential result is a system of trade 
defences targeted in a discriminatory and even punitive manner against heterodox 
institutional forms, in ways which can only dis-incentivise institutional experimentation. 
Instead of being a blunt but potentially legitimate instrument to pursue goals of stability, cost-
sharing or distributional equity, as Jackson originally described, trade defences would in this 
future be (or, perhaps, continue to be) a more questionable instrument of competitive 
commercial policy or ideological projection. In response, I have argued for an approach to 
the interpretation and application of this concept which proceeds from an understanding of 
the institutionally embedded character of markets. This does not take the form of a readily 
available ‘solution’, but rather a messy and evolving set of legal techniques which, in the best 
case, will form the legal basis of a practical and justifiable approach to the frictions caused by 
institutional diversity. A toolkit of legal techniques of this kind cannot, of course, take the 
place of a more foundational political settlement of some sort, but it is a necessary 
accompaniment to it, if we are to preserve the aspiration towards a genuinely non-
discriminatory and rules-based global economic order. 
 
 
